Abstract
Economics, particularly through the field of Industrial Organization, has always influenced antitrust. The power of economics is its ability to provide visions of the world — i.e. theories — that can explain behavior — i.e. facts. Both theory and fact are crucial. Theory without fact has an untested quality that many abhor, particularly lawyers who consider themselves steeped in everyday reality; fact without theory has an ad hoc cast, making, at the extreme, all cases individual and unconnected to each other. Both theory and fact have had important roles in the history of the influence of economics upon antitrust, as I have written elsewhere.1
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Arthur, W. Brian, “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock in by Historical Events,” Economic Journal, volume 99, 1989, pp. 116–131.
Arthur, W. Brian, “Positive Feedbacks in the Economy,” 262 Scientific American,, February 1990, pp. 92–99.
Bork, Robert, Antitrust Paradox, New York: Basic Books, 1978.
Bowman, Ward S., Jr, “Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,” Yale Law Journal, vol.67, 1957, pp. 19–27.
Cassidy, John, “The Force of an Idea,” The New Yorker, January 12, 1998, pp. 32–37.
Dahlman, Carl, “The Problem of Externality,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 22, 1979, pp. 141–163.
David, Paul, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” American Economic Review, vol. 75, 1985, pp. 332–337.
Evans, D.S., and R. Schmainese, “A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Networks,” Antitrust, vol.10(2), 1996, pp. 36–40.
Garland, Susan B., “Justice vs. Microsoft: Why It Has a Case,” Business Week, November 17, 1997, p. 147.
Goldschmid, Harvey et al., Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, 1974.
Gomes, Lee, “QWERTY Spells a Saga of Market Economics.” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 1998, B1&B6.
Gross, Nell, and Paul C. Judge, “Let’s Talk,” Business Week, February 23, 1998, pp. 60–80.
Fisher, Franklin, “Organizing Industrial Organization: Reflections on the Handbook of Industrial Organization,” Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, 1991.
Hamm, Steve, “Microsoft’s Future,” Business Week, January 19, 1998, pp. 58–84.
Hamm, Steve, “Going After Gates,” Business Week, November 3, 1997, pp. 34–35.
Katz, Michael L., and Carl Shapiro, “Systems Competition and Network Effects,” vol.8(2), 1994, Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp. 93–115.
Krugman, Paul. 1994. “The Economics of QWERTY,” Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in the Age of Diminished Expectations, chap. 9.
Lapatka, John E. and Andrew N. Kleit, “The Mystery of Lorain Journal and the Quest for Foreclosure in Antitrust,” Texas Law Review, vol. 73, 1995, pp. 1255–1306.
Liebeler, Wesley, “What is Antitrust All About?” Unpublished, 1998.
Liebowitz, S. J. and Stephen E. Margolis, “Policy and Path Dependence from QWERTY to Windows 95,” Regulation, vol. 3, 1995, p. 222.
Liebowitz, S. J. and Stephen E. Margolis, “Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8(2), 1994, pp. 133–150.
Liebowitz, S. J. and Stephen E. Margolis, “The Fable of the Keys,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 33, 1990, pp. 1–25.
Muris, Timothy J, “Economics and Antitrust,” 5 George Mason Law Review, vol. 5, 1997, pp. 303–312.
—, “What Can Be Done?” In Kenneth W. Clarkson and Timothy J. Muris, eds., The Federal Trade Commission Since 1970: Economic Regulation & Bureaucratic Behavior, 1981, chap. 16.
Peltzman, Sam, “The Handbook of Industrial Organization: A Review Article,” Journal of Political Economics, vol. 99, 1991, pp. 201–207.
Rill, James, “Why Bill Gates is Wrong.” Wall Street Journal, November 20, 1997.
Telser, Lester G, “Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, 1960, pp. 86–105.
Whinston, Michael D., “Tying, Foreclosure & Exclusion,” American Economic Review, vol. 80, 1990, p. 837.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Muris, T.J. (1999). Is Heightened Antitrust Scrutiny Appropriate for Software Markets?. In: Eisenach, J.A., Lenard, T.M. (eds) Competition, Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4407-0_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4407-0_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5894-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-4407-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive