Abstract
The major topic of this chapter is the interaction of theoretical traditions in the social science study of common-pool resources (or the commons). One specific contribution to the more general philosophical debate on the growth of science will function as a background to an examination of the study of the commons as a field of theoretical and empirical investigation. In the first section, an introduction is given to Lakatos’s theory of scientific research programmes as a means of understanding and encouraging scientific progress. Then an account is given of two groups of leading theoretical perspectives in the study of common-pool resources, the tragedy of the commons and related models on the one hand, and theories of cooperative action on the other. In the concluding section, these two perspectives are treated as research programmes and evaluated according to Lakatos’s standards; it is discussed to what extent they have proven successful according to his criteria for progressive science and in furthering a general growth of scientific knowledge in the field.
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Notes
The chapter has been published as Homeland (1999a).
The word confirmation is here used to indicate that the results of an experimental test turn out to support a theory, rather than to actually prove a theory, as this is envisaged in an inductivist/positivist perspective.
Both terms are here used to denote a cluster of theories. The concept of cooperative action theory is in this context invented for that purpose. The tragedy of the commons, on the other hand, is a well-established term used here to indicate both the perspective as a whole and the leading model within this perspective. Another common label of the latter perspective, common property (see e.g. Jentoft 1987) theory is avoided since it might be mistaken for the field as a whole (or for its subfield calling for a privatisation of common property resources).
Liberal philosophers such as Locke held a similarly “suspicious” view of common property, but argued that individuals could collectively agree to respect each others’ rights without recourse to external centralised power.
Precaution should, however, be made in grouping Olson together with Hardin, as the former’s model is far more nuanced than that of the latter.
Some might wonder at my grouping together of theories which prescribe as different solutions as state ownership and privatisation; it is, however, their epistemological bases which lie at the heart of this decision.
For instance, Ostrom et al. (1994: 301ff) single out the presence of boundary rules and authority rules related to allocation, active forms of monitoring and sanctioning, and the absence of grim trigger strategies as common features of the self-organised common-pool resources under investigation.
There certainly are arguments for treating the two perspectives as components of one overarching research programme within the social science study of the commons. In particular, much of the research conducted under the auspices of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (see above) stands close to public choice theory. As should follow from the discussion in this article, however, there are major differences in both the positive and negative heuristics of the two traditions.
The word various is used instead of alternative since some of the co-operative action theory is in fact directed towards testing both Hardinian and alternative assumptions (see e.g. Ostrom et al. 1994 and Baland & Platteau 1996). This said, the bulk of the literature here classified as co-operative action theory has an inclination towards testing alternative assumptions and explanations.
This statement also points to the fact that economists tend to dominate the tragedy of the commons perspective, whereas “applied researchers”, by which is here meant more empirically oriented writers, are in majority in the co-operative action programme.
Admittedly, there is more to the story than these theoretical peculiarities. As many of the critics have emphasised, the popularity of the “tragedy” has much to do with politics and rhetoric. Commenting on the dispute between the economists and anthropologists, Brox asserts: “Epistemologically, the conflict often presents itself as one between a priori reasoning and the study of empirical variation. The schism may also be seen as based on the conflict of interest between the traditional rights of marginal populations and the expansionist tendencies of capitalist or planned economies” (Brox 1990: 227).
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Hønneland, G. (2000). The Interaction of Research Programmes in Social Science Studies of the Commons. In: Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources. Environment & Policy, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4044-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4044-7_2
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