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Abstract

Edmund Phelps’ article reviews coercive rules for monetary policy. Since Friedman’s proposal of a simple k% money rule, economists have come up with a great variety of more sophisticated rules. A common objective of all rules is to hinder the agent central bank from producing permanent inflation, while some rules aim in addition at enforcing a certain degree of employment stabilization. There is no ideal rule, of course; each rule has its merits as well as drawbacks, as Phelps points out. Consequently, it seems we need a comparative evaluation in order to determine which of the various proposals is the most promising in terms of a lasting welfare gain to the central bank’s principal, the private sector.

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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Neumann, M.J.M. (1991). Commentary. In: Belongia, M.T. (eds) Monetary Policy on the 75th Anniversary of the Federal Reserve System. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3888-8_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3888-8_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5731-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-3888-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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