Abstract
In Part II, Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy was subjected to what might be called a `de-construction’. That is to say, we focused our attention upon the attempt at a constitution of four critical regions of being, critical in the sense that the constitutional procedure could only be carried through by assuming a condition (of coincidence) which ran contrary to the very principle (of presence) upon which the method of phenomenological constitution is itself based. De-construction has of late become a generally recognized critical procedure. What has not been so generally recognized has been the need to complement the de-constructive procedure with a reconstructive procedure. This is what will be attempted in this third part. Through just such a re-construction, we hope to find ourselves in a position to draw together the various threads of an argument which could only be presented, hitherto, in a disconnected fashion.
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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Macann, C. (1991). Genetic Ontology. In: Presence and Coincidence. Phaenomenologica, vol 119. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3754-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3754-6_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-5670-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-3754-6
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