Abstract
In this chapter I propose to interrupt the main course of our argument in order to develop some very general considerations about events in time. These have a bearing on our present problem because a judgment is an occurrence or an event in time, and anything that can be said about events in general will apply to judgments in particular, and may help us to elucidate the logical category to which they belong. We shall, in fact, find that the word event is used in two different senses, and that there is no agreement as to which of these senses is applicable to judgments.
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Notes
Cf. G.E. Moore, “Facts and Propositions,” in “Mind, Objectivity and Fact,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume VII (1927), p. 176.
See for an instance of this W.E. Johnson, “Analysis of Seeing,” Mind, vol. 27 (1918), p. 142
G.E. Moore, Analysis of Seeing Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 21 (1920–21), p. 136. But reference above shows that he has changed his view since then.
Cf. the first part of Mr Russell’s article on “Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative,” in Mind, vol. 10 (1901), pp. 293–317. It need hardly be mentioned that this article does not give his present views.
For an admirable discussion of the relations of events and objects see A.N. Whitehead’s An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (Cambridge, 1919)
For an admirable discussion of the relations of events and objects see A.N. Whitehead’s Concept of Nature (Cambridge, 1920).
C.D. Broad, Scientific Thought (London, 1923), p. 4.
Cf. C.D. Broad, Mind and its Place in Nature (London, 1925), p. 597.
Broad, Mind and Its Place in Nature (London, 1925), p. 559. Of his two forms of the Pure Ego theory the first is in our sense a substance theory, the second an event theory.
Cf. G.E. Moore, “Facts and Propositions,” in “Mind, Objectivity, and Fact,” Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volume VII (1927), pp. 176–7.
A fact of Prof. Moore’s first class. Op. cit., p. 174.
McTaggart, The Nature of Existence (Cambridge, 1927), Vol. 2, Ch XXXIII.
Broad, Scientific Thought (London, 1923), Ch. 2.
See also R.B. Braithwaite, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume VIII (1928), pp. 162–174.
J.W. Dunne, An Experiment with Time. (London, 1927).
Russell’s argument against Neutral Monism based on Emphatic Particulars (Monist, July 1914) seems to involve just this muddle. Since his conversion to Neutral Monism no more has been heard of it, although in 1919, it was the argument on which he placed most reliance (Monist, 1919, p. 55).
MacTaggart, Nature of Existence, Vol. 2, Ch. XXXIII.
Broad, Scientific Thought, Ch. 2.
R.B. Braithwaite, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume VIII (1928), pp. 162–174.
Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics, sect. 442;
quoted by McTaggart, Nature of Existence, Vol. 2, Ch. XXXIII, p. 14.
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Ramsey, F.P., Rescher, N., Majer, U. (1991). Judgment and Time [or? Time and the Mind]. In: Rescher, N., Majer, U. (eds) On Truth. Episteme, vol 16. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3738-6_6
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