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Husserl and the Heritage of Transcendental Philosophy

  • Marek J. Siemek
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 34)

Abstract

The deep and multiform impact of Husserl’s thought on the whole of contemporary philosophy is well known and has been recognized a long time since. But only now, fifty years after Husserl, do we start to become aware of what is really contemporary in his thought, that is, of what makes him not only and simply one of honorable classics of some “twentieth-century philosophy” in general, but also the thinker of special importance for just our time, i.e., already and clearly for the second half of this century. Simultaneously, we can today more and more clearly realize that the threads of Husserl’s philosophy which have become important only for our present era, and, consequently, in Husserl himself run furthest of all in the future, are exactly those same threads which most of all bind his thought with an inheritance from the past: namely, with the tradition of transcendental philosophy.

Keywords

Transcendental Idealism Transcendental Philosophy Cartesian Meditation Transcendental Subjectivity Animate Organism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 5.
    Above all in §10 (“Digression: Descartes’ Failure to Make the Transcendental Turn”) of Cartesian Meditations (CM, pp. 23–25).Google Scholar
  2. 6.
    For this interpretation of Kantian-Fichtean transcendental philosophy cf. Marek J. Siemek, Die Idee des Transzendentalismus bei Fichte und Kant (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1984); also Marek J. Siemek, “Schelling gegen Fichte. Zwei Paradigmen des nachkantianischen Denkens,” in Transzendentalphilosophie als System. Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen 1794 und 1806, ed. A. Mues (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1989), pp. 388–395.Google Scholar
  3. 7.
    I. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 132 (cited according to the Kemp Smith translation).Google Scholar
  4. 8.
    I. Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 150–156.Google Scholar
  5. 9.
    Cf. J. G. Fichte: “Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge,” in J. G. Fichte: The Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), Part One and Two, pp. 93–217.Google Scholar
  6. 12.
    Fichte calls it “Kant’s empirical realism, which is also a transcendental idealism.” See “Second Introduction” J. G. Fichte: “Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge,” in J. G. Fichte: The Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), §6, J. G. Fichte: “Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge,” in J. G. Fichte: The Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) p. 62. Cf. J. G. Fichte: “Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge,” in J. G. Fichte: The Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) p. 55, as well as I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 40–45 and B 48–53. Cf.  Marek J. Siemek, Die Idee des Transzendentalismus bei Fichte und Kant (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1984), pp. 127–158.Google Scholar
  7. 13.
    Cf. especially CM §44, pp. 97–99.Google Scholar
  8. 14.
    Cf. especially CM §44, p. 97. For the transcendental function of body as “animate organism” in Husserl, cf. also Ludwig Landgrebe, “The Problem of Teleology and Corporeality in Phenomenology and Marxism,” in Phenomenology and Marxism, ed. B. Waldenfels, J. M. Broekman, and A. Pažanin, transl. J. Claude Evans, Jr., (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 53–81.Google Scholar
  9. 15.
    “Accordingly the intrinsically first order (the first “non-Ego”) is the other Ego.” (CM §49, p. 107) In the German original, Husserl uses the Fichtean terms: “Ich” and “nicht-Ich.”Google Scholar
  10. 16.
    Cf. CM §43, pp. 90–92.Google Scholar
  11. 17.
    “it is a law of consciousness: no subject, no object; no object, no subjects” ( J. G. Fichte: “Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge,” in J. G. Fichte: The Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 168.)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marek J. Siemek
    • 1
  1. 1.University of WarsawPoland

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