Foundedness and Motivation

  • Chan Wing-Cheuk
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 34)


“Foundedness” and “Motivation” are two fundamental notions in phenomenology.1 But what is the relationship between them? It seems to be quite difficult to find an answer to this question in the existing literature of phenomenology. For example, no one can deny that these two concepts play important roles in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. But to this question Merleau-Ponty did not provide any answer. He did not even give us any thematic characterizations of both concepts, except for some short notes of clarification. The lack of an explicit clarification of the relationship between “foundedness” and “motivation” often makes one wonder if these two concepts are synonymous or interchangeable. Our task here is to trace back the problem in the phenomenology of Husserl and to provide a clarification of these two concepts, so that a precise relationship between them can be determined.


Logical Investigation Intentional Relationship Rational Motivation Pure Species Logical Concept 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 3.
    Cf. Logical Investigations, pp. 455–462.Google Scholar
  2. 5.
    Cf. Elmar Holenstein, Phänomenologie der Assoziation, p. 171.Google Scholar
  3. 6.
    Traditionally, talk of “motiv” is confined to the field of emotional, in particular, volitional phenomena. Cf. Logical Investigations, p. 273.Google Scholar
  4. 7.
    Cf. Logische Untersuchungen §28; J. N. Findlay translated Begründung as “strict demonstration.”Google Scholar
  5. 8.
    In some manuscripts one can also find out his analysis of this new conception, e.g., A VI 25, pp. 7–9: “Motivation, passive und aktive Motivation” (1924); p. 11: “Ob man bei Assoziation von Motivation sprechen Kann” (1924); A VI 19, p. 17: “Verständlichkeit der Motivationserkenntnis“(1916?); A IV 17, p. 30a: “Motivation und Assoziation” (untranscribed) and EIII 2, pp. 53–4: Kausale Erklärung von Phychischen und Motivation (1921) (partially quoted in Holenstein’s book, p. 184); also in Ding und Raum, pp. 358–368, Motivationszummenhang und Apperzeption (1916).Google Scholar
  6. 9.
    Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers III, p. 37.Google Scholar
  7. 10.
    Elmar Holenstein, Phänomenologie der Assoziation, p. 185.Google Scholar
  8. 11.
    Bernhard Rang, Kausalität und Motivation, p. 115.Google Scholar
  9. 13.
    Cf. Elmar Holenstein, Phänomenologie der Assoziation, p. 188Google Scholar
  10. 14.
    For a detailed exposition of the roles played by the rational and associative motivations in the problem of constitution, cf. Rang’s Kausalität und Motivation.Google Scholar
  11. 15.
    For an analysis of the different meanings of “apperception”, cf. Elmar Holenstein, Phänomenologie der Assoziation, pp. 132–166.Google Scholar
  12. 16.
    Cf. Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 49–58. Whether it is possible to work out a kind of modal logic which is “strong” enough to develop a “logic of motivation”, still remains an open-problem. But the author is skeptical as to this possibility.Google Scholar
  13. 19.
    Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, p. 13.Google Scholar
  14. 20.
    Cf. Ideen II, p. 240.Google Scholar
  15. 21.
    For the role played by the associative motivation in the Sinngenesis, cf. Holenstein, Elmar Holenstein, Phänomenologie der Assoziation, p 171.Google Scholar
  16. 22.
    Logical Investigations, p. 571.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chan Wing-Cheuk
    • 1
  1. 1.Tunghai UniversityChina

Personalised recommendations