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Organisms, Individuals, and Units of Selection

  • Elliott Sober
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 129)

Abstract

We often think of science—and of philosophy as well—as a process by which puzzlement is removed. This suggests that progress in a science is to be measured by the degree to which it eliminates problems rather than creating them. We sometimes say of an idea that “it raises more problems than it solves.” The fact that this remark is used to state a criticism perhaps indicates that we think of problems as if they were rashes on the skin of the body scientific. Scientific progress makes rashes go away.

Keywords

Natural Kind Group Selection Individual Selection Meiotic Drive Selfish Individual 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elliott Sober
    • 1
  1. 1.University of WisconsinUSA

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