Abstract
Kuhn’s theory of paradigms is a textualism: there is, so to speak, nothing outside the paradigm. Thus (following Richard Rorty’s remarks on affinities between textualism and idealism), this theory is an idealism. However, Kuhn relies upon an implicit realism that is forced upon him by the very nature of science. In other words: his idealism is prompted by his astute attention to the act of scientific inquiry, while his realism enters by way of his characterization of the object of that inquiry. I use Ricoeur’s text theory in responding to this dual commitment as exemplifying certain tendencies in our contemporary intellectual situation.
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© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Langsdorf, L. (1992). Realism and Idealism in the Kuhnian Account of Science. In: Hardy, L., Embree, L. (eds) Phenomenology of Natural Science. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2622-9_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2622-9_9
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