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A Theory of Demand for Governmentally Supplied Goods and Services

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Preferences and Democracy

Part of the book series: International Studies in Economics and Econometrics ((ISEE,volume 28))

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Abstract

The paper proposes a theory of demand for governmentally supplied goods and services which takes seriously the facts that there are numerous centers of power in all governments and that few of these are elected. The paper rejects the idea that the competition which exists between these centers of power is solely motivated by hubris or megalomania. It argues that the incitation to compete is furnished by the need of centers of power for the consent of citizens. Citizens, in turn, it is assumed, grant more of their consent if, at given taxprices, centers of power provide them with goods and services in quantities that more closely approach the quantities they desire. It is, therefore, intragovernmental competition which activates the mechanisms which lead citizens to reveal their nominal demands for governmentally supplied goods and services. It is the same competition, it is further argued, which explains why governmental centers of power, not only sponsor the creation of demand lobbies, but also contribute to the solution of the free-riding and shirking problems that confront these lobbies.

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Authors
  1. Albert Breton
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Toronto, Canada

    Albert Breton

  2. University of Perugia, Italy

    Gianluigi Galeotti

  3. University of Bourgogne, France

    Pierre Salmon

  4. University of Western Ontario, Canada

    Ronald Wintrobe

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© 1993 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Breton, A. (1993). A Theory of Demand for Governmentally Supplied Goods and Services. In: Breton, A., Galeotti, G., Salmon, P., Wintrobe, R. (eds) Preferences and Democracy. International Studies in Economics and Econometrics, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2188-0_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2188-0_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4969-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-2188-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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