Abstract
Government risk-bearing in the financial sector has been increasing rapidly in recent years, apparently without any overall economic rationale. Now that the appropriate government role in handling private-sector risks is being reassessed, it is worthwhile to examine both the long history of public involvement in agricultural risk-bearing and its economic implications, which may hold some lessons for the financial sector. The economic puzzles in the two industries are refreshingly different, yet intriguingly similar.
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Wright, B.D., Pauly, M.V. (1993). Public Insurance of Private Risks: Theory and Evidence from Agriculture. In: Sniderman, M.S. (eds) Government Risk-Bearing. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2184-2_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2184-2_3
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