Abstract
Jan Srzednicki’s The Democratic Perspective: Political and Social Philosophy 2 examines the problem confronting social planners of inadequate knowledge. As he puts it, ’[w]e are faced... with the task of planning for sociopolitical betterment and development in [the] absence of the necessary background and detailed knowledge’.3 In turning to political philosophy, then, far from deserting his overriding concern with epistemological issues, he sees them as crucial.
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Notes
I wish to thank Horst Imberger, Vanessa Mitchell, and David Tucker for their criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper. A debt of a very different kind is owed to Jan himself over many years as supervisor, colleague, and friend.
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1987.
Op. cit., p. 2.
Op. cit., p. 308.
Op. cit., p. 360.
Op. cit., p. 29, cf. p. 23.
Op. cit., p. 2.
Op. cit., p. 305.
Op. cit., p. 23.
Op. cit., p. 305.
Op. cit., p. 2, cf. p. 339.
Op. cit., pp. 343, 364, 368. See also Srzednicki’s discussion of pluralism in ‘Appendix: Some General Remarks on Pluralism and the Relative Satisfactoriness of Systems of Political Control’, Elements of Social and Political Philosophy, pp. 173–184 (Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, Dordrecht, 1976).
Op. cit., p. 368.
The Modern Democratic State (Oxford University Press, London, 1943).
‘Nature and Convention in the Democratic State, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 29, pp. 1–20 (1951). I shall follow Srzednicki in concentrating on Gibson’s version of constitutionalism rather than Lindsay’s.
Op. cit., p. 1.
Op. cit., p. 5, cf. pp. 12–3.
The Democratic Perspective, op. cit., p. 289. This paper avoids the vital issue of the role of neutrality in liberal theory, but see William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991), and references therein.
Op. cit., p. 289, cf. Gibson, op. cit., p. 9, Lindsay, op. cit., 226.
Op. cit., p. 294, cf. Gibson, op. cit., pp. 10–11, p. 16.
Op. cit., p. 290. Srzednicki’s emphasis.
The Democratic Perspective, op. cit., 302, cf. 288.
Gibson, op. cit., p. 10.
Op. cit., p. 20. Gibson’s emphasis.
Ibid.
Op. cit., p. 13, cf. The Democratic Perspective, op. cit., p. 289.
Op. cit., p. 302.
Srzednicki points out that Gibson accepts the second alternative, whereas Lindsay is uncommitted. But as Gibson understands Lindsay, he ignores the role of distributive justice, and so does not get to the point where this dilemma even arises for him.
Op. cit., p. 11.
Op. cit., p. 17.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972.
Op. cit., p. 297.
Op. cit., p. 15.
Op. cit., pp. 297–8.
Op. cit., p. 16.
Op. cit., p. 15.
The Democratic Perspective, op. cit.,p. 301, p. 304.
H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, p. 20 (Oxford University Press, London, 1963).
Op. cit., p. 19.
I’ll ignore the distinction Srzednicki draws between ‘tolerance’ and ‘pluralism’, op. cit., pp. 340ff, 367–8.
Op. cit.,p. 298.
Op. cit., p. 299.
Op. cit.,pp. 298–9.
Op. cit., pp. 295–6.
Op. cit., p. 344.
Op. cit., p. 351.
Op. cit., p. 290.
Op. cit., p. 290.
Ibid.
Op. cit. p. 323. Note that he recognises hybrid approaches too; op. cit. p. 324.
Op. cit., p. 323.
Op. cit., p. 324.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Op. cit., p. 328.
Op. cit., p. 324. On incrementalism in Kevin Scholes, Exploring Corporate Strategy: Hemel Hempstead, 1989).
Op. cit. p. 325.
On the notion of momentum in corporate strategy,see Johnson and Scholes, op. cit., p. 25.
Op. cit., p. 326, cf. pp. 328–9.
Op. cit., p. 328.
Ibid
Op. cit., pp. 328–9.
Op. cit., p. 361.
Op. cit., p. 329, cf. p. 333, pp. 336–7. As pointed out below, Srzednicki goes on to reject the idea that a sequentialist strategy or plan can amount to a ‘blueprint’.
Op. cit., p. 329.
Op. cit.,p. 333.
Op. cit., p. 334.
Op. cit., p. 320.
Op. cit., p. 365. See also his discussion of the example of exploitation, op. cit., pp. 326–7.
Op. cit., p. 331, cf. p. 368.
Op. cit., p. 331.
Op. cit., p. 368.
Op. cit., p. 326.
Op. cit., p. 328.
Op. cit., p. 329.
Op. cit., pp. 331–2.
Op. cit., p. 335.
Op. cit., pp. 363.
Op. cit., p. 363, pp. 340–1.
Op. cit., p. 342.
Op. cit., p. 363.
Ibid.
Op. cit., p. 364.
Op. cit., p. 330.
Ibid.
Op. cit., p. 356.
Op. cit., p. 362, p. 367.
The extreme case of this Srzednicki refers to as ‘Pol-Potism’, the extermination of all opponents. Op. cit., pp. 352–4.
Op. cit., p. 317.
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Wood, D. (1993). Social Planning, Constitutionalism and Pluralistic Sequentialism. In: Poli, R. (eds) Consciousness, Knowledge, and Truth. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-2060-9_12
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