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‘Omnis phoenix est’: Quantification and Existence in a new sophismata-collection (MS Clm 14522)

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Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar

Part of the book series: Nijhoff International Philosophy Series ((NIPS,volume 48))

Abstract

It is well known that between (approximately) 1250 and 1275 important innovations took place in the Parisian Faculty of Arts. The introduction of the Aristotelian libri naturales in the syllabus of 1255 marks the end of a period when the masters’ interest focused mainly on the disciplines of the trivium.1 The flow of exegetical works resulting from courses on logic and grammar now began to be matched by a comparable quantity of commentaries devoted to natural and moral philosophy. Moreover, Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle was more carefully investigated and assimilated. The free attitude of the Arabic thinker towards speculation was assumed as a model by some masters, a trend eventually leading to a clash with ecclesiastical authority concerning the limits of orthodox philosophical teaching.2

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Notes

  1. See P.O. Lewry, “Thirteenth-Century Examination Compendia from the Faculty of Arts”, in Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales. Définition, critique et exploitation. Actes du Colloque International de Louvain-La-Neuve, 25-27 mai 1981 (Publications de l’Institut d’Études médiévales, 2e série: Textes, Études, Congrés, vol. 5), Louvain-La-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain 1982, pp. 101-16.

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  2. See R.A. Gauthier, “Notes sur le débuts (1225–1240) du premier ‘averroïsme’”, Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques 66, 1982, pp. 321–374.

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  3. See S. Ebbesen, “Three 13th-century Sophismata about Beginning and Ceasing”, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin 59, 1989, pp. 121–180, esp. p.127, n.l. For the use of the term in MS München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14522 see below, nn. 4 and 16.

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  4. For a sophismatic treatment of the fallacy of accident, see clm 14522, ff. 37ra-va: “Iuxta hoc queritur que diuersificatio medii faciat fallaciam accidentis. Solutio. Dico quod in predicto problemate sophismatis est fallacia accidentis. Notandum ad intellectum fallacie accidentis quod duplex accidens exigitur ad hoc quod fiat fallacia accidentis … Notandum igitur pro regula quod quando medium diuersificatur inter maiorem extremitatem et minorem fit fallacia accidentis. Set duplex est diuersificatio medii, scilicet substantialis et accidentalis …” (f. 37ra). The analysis of unity is contained ibid. ff. 41va-42rb: “Aristotiles etiam posuit quod unum conuertitur cum ente, et est eiusdem intentionis cum eo, cuius sectator et expositor est Auerois. Videamus ergo de significato unius, et dicamus cum Aristotile quod eadem sunt principia substantie et accidentis.…” (f. 42vb) For the converse case of a sophismatic treatment of the problem of unity in a philosophical commentary see P. Delhaye, Siger de Brabant. Questions sur la Physique d’Aristote, Louvain: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie 1941, pp. 43-44 (1.I, q. 17: utrum tantum unum ens sit).

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  5. The works of William of Sherwood and of Nicholas of Paris are respectively edited in J.R. O’Donnell, “The Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood”, Mediaeval Studies 3, 1941, pp. 46-93 and in H.A.G. Braakhuis, De 13de eeuwse Tractaaten over syncategorematische termen. Deel II: Uitgave van Nicolaas van Parijs’ Syncategoreumata, Nijmegen: Krips Repro Meppel 1979. Richard’s sophisms are listed by L.M. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum II.1; The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of Supposition, Assen: Van Gorcum 1967, pp. 62-71, but see now Paul Streveler’s contribution in this volume. The list of the sophisms in MS Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Apost. Vat., lat. 7678 reported by M. Grabmann, Die Sophismataliteratur des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts mit Textausgabe eines Sophisma der Boethius von Dacien. Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 36.1, 1940, pp. 33-41 is to be corrected with the additions by Braakhuis, De 13 eeuwse, Deel I: Inleidende Studie, pp. 33-65 and 420-2. For the mid 13th-century collections see below, n. 7.

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  6. See S. Ebbesen, “Talking about what is no more. Texts by Peter of Cornwall (?), Richard of Clive, Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito”, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin 55, 1987, pp. 135–68, with the relevant literature.

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  7. The following is a list of the known collections approximately dating to the third quarter of the 13th century, with the relevant literature: 1) MS Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek der Stadt, Ampl. 4° 328, ff. lra-73vb: see Braakhuis, De 13de eeuwse, Deel I, pp. 83-7 and idem, “Kilwardby versus Bacon?”, in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics. Studies Dedicated to L.M. de Rijk, ed. E.P. Bos, Nijmegen: Ingenium 1985, pp. 111-42; 2) MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16135, ff. 3ra-37rb (first collection): see A. de Libera, “La littérature des Sophismata dans la tradition terministe parisienne de la seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle”, in The Editing of Theological and Philosophical Texts from the Middle Ages, ed. M. Asztalos, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1986, pp. 213-44; A. de Libera, “La problematique de l’instant du changement au XIIIe siècle: contribution a l’histoire des sophismata physicalia”, in Studies in Medieval Natural Philosophy, ed. S. Caroti, Firenze: Olschki 1989, pp. 43-93; and A. de Libera, “Le sophisma anonyme’ sor desinit esse non desinendo esse’ du Cod. Parisinus 16135”, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin 59, 1989, pp. 113-120; 3) MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16135, ff. 38ra-103vb (second collection): see de Libera, “La littérature des Sophismata” and “Le sophisma anonyme”; I. Rosier, “‘O Magister …’: Grammaticalité et intelligibilité selon un sophisme du XIIIe siècle”, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin 56, 1988, pp. 1-102; and C. Brousseau-Beuermann’s contribution in this volume; 4) MS Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16618, ff. 137r-52vb: see de Libera, “La littérature des Sophismata”, pp. 213-5; 5) MS Worcester, Cathedral Library, Q. 13, ff. 24vb-53vb: see C. Lohr, “Aristotelica Britannica”, Théologie und Philosophie 53, 1978, pp. 97-9; P.O. Lewry, “The Oxford Condemnations of 1277 in Grammar and Logic”, in English Logic and Semantics from the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh, ed. H.A.G. Braakhuis et al., Nijmegen: Ingenium 1981, pp. 235-78; P.O. Lewry, “Oxford Logic 1250-1275: Nicholas and Peter of Cornwall on Past and Future Realities”, in The Rise of British Logic, ed. P.O. Lewry, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1985, pp. 193-234; Ebbesen, “Talking about” and Ebbesen “Three 13th-century”; 6) MS Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellonska 649, ff. 253ra-271vb: see A. Tabarroni, “Incipit and desinit in a thirteenth-century sophismata-collection”, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin 59, 1989, pp. 61-111.

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  8. See B. Faes de Mottoni, Aegidii Romani Opera omnia. I. Catalogo del manoscritti (457-505). 115*. Repubblica Federale di Germania (Monaco), Firenze: Olsckhi 1990, n. 483, pp. 145-50.

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  9. Whitby’s authorship of the commentary on De sensu is suggested by Faes de Mottoni, p. 148. She points to the similar incipit of the attributed copy in MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16149, ff. 62ra-67va. The Super de memoria has a different incipit from its companion in the Parisian MS (ff. 60rb-61rb), but cf. the passage reported by R.-A. Gauthier in Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia, t. XIV,2: Sentencia libri de sensu et sensato, cura et studio FF. Praedicatorum, Roma: Commissio Leonina 1984, (Préface) p. 125* with the following: “Ex hiis autem uidetur quod ista pars est de continuatione scientie tradite in libro De anima, sicut pars precedens que est de mouente. Sicut enim ibi agitur de uirtutibus apprehensiuis in quantum sunt motiue uno modo, sic hic agitur de eiusdem uirtutibus alio modo, licet contrarium huius appareat ex recapitulatione facta in fine libri De sensu et sensato et etiam ex quodam dicto in hac parte.” (clm 14522, f. 155va26-32) The two commentaries on De sompno and De morte et vita appear to be linked by close affinity to the preceding ones. Adam of Whitby is not mentioned in Emden’s register of the Oxford University.

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  10. B. Bischoff and C.E. Ineichen-Eder, Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweitz, vol. IV/1, München: Beck 1977, pp. 159–160: “Item sophysmata de villa Parysiensi. Item Egidius super librum elencorum. Item super de sensu et sensato. Item liber de sompno et vigilia. Item de morte et vita. Item super metheororum. Item super de plantis, omnes in uno volumine.”

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  11. See Faes de Mottoni, Aegidii Romani I, I/5*, n. 483, p. 146 and 148, under the section “Correzioni e annotazioni.”

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  12. The following would have been the correct order of the eight fascicles forming part 1 of the codex: I-II-IV-VI-VII-VIII-III-V. Due to the misplacing of the two quires, the sophisms are presently in the following order: 1-2-3 (beg.)-11 (end)-12-13 (beg.)-3 (end)-4 (fragm.)-Communia-13 (end)-14 (mutil.)-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 (beg.).

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  13. The copyist’s attitude is described by Faes de Mottoni, Aegidii Romani I, 1/5*, n. 483, p. 146.

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  14. The attribution dates back at least to the last decades of the 15th century, when Laurentius Aicher of St. Emmeram wrote the table of contents at the beginning of the MS describing the collection as “Sophysmata Alberti de Saxonia.” On the history of St. Emmeram’s library in the late Middle Ages see, B. Bischoff, Studien zur Geschichte des Klosters St. Emmeram im Spätmittelalter (1324-1525), in idem, Mittelalterliche Studien, II. Stuttgart: Hiersemann 1967, pp. 115-49 and Bischoff and Ineichen-Eder, Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge, IV.1, pp. 99-138.

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  15. See Tabarroni, “Incipit and desinit”, p. 64.

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  16. See e.g. clm 14522, f. 6rb42 (sicut dictum fuit in soluendo), f. 29vb31 (ut uisum est superius in soluendo), f. 19va3-4 (sicut etiam dictum fuit in opponendo), f. 16va20 (sicut dictum fuit superius in respondendo), f. 59ra34 (et hoc planius manifestabitur in soluendo corpus sophismatis in secundo problemate), f. 61va31-32 (superius in soluendo corpus sophismatis).

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  17. Clm 14522, f. 24ral 1–13: “De prima distinctione nihil dicemus nisi illud quod dictum est in illo sophismate TOTUS SORTES etc. De secunda nihil dicemus nisi quod dictum fuit in illo sophismate TANTUM UNUM EST”; ibid., f. 57vb36-39: “Circa quartum sufficienter processum est disputando hoc sophisma ‘QUANTO ALIQUID MAIUS EST TANTO MINUS VIDETUR’; ibi discussum est que diuersificatio medii faciat fallaciam accidentis et que non.”

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  18. Ibid., f. 60vb8-14: “Primum quod ponunt est distinctionem ualere ad propositum. Quod falsum est, ut iam uidebitur in soluendo quandam aliam distinctionem que communiter ponitur in illo sophismate OMNIS ANIMA NECESSARIO EST IUSTA, scilicet quod hec dictio ‘necessario’ potest determinare compositionem principalem predicati ad subiectum aut potest determinare predicatum gratia compositionis in ipso intellecte. Quod similiter est falsum, ut iam patebit inferius in eodem sophismate suo loco, ymmo semper determinat principalem compositionem predicati ad subiectum”; f. 63ra 15-20: “Ad ea que postea queruntur, quia inprincipalia sunt in hoc sophismate, set magis principalia sunt in illo sophismate OMNIS HOMO DE NECESSITATE EST ANIMAL, ideo breuiter pertranseundum est de hiis. Et sciendum quod est controuersia de hoc inter quosdam. Dicunt quidam quod, <nullo> homine existente, hec sunt uere ‘homo est homo’, ‘homo est animal’. Ad quorum controversiam uidendam notandum quod duplex est esse uniuersale, scilicet esse actuate et essentiale.”

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  19. Ibid., f. 63ra20-28: “Et appellatur esse actuate esse in supposito, appellatur esse essentiale ipsius uniuersalis in comparatione ad suam diffinitionem. Dicitur communiter quod quantum ad esse actuate omnes sunt false, quantum ad esse essentiale omnes sunt vere. Dicunt quod omni supposito destructo adhuc remanet habitudo eorum ad suam diffinitionem uel habitudo unius ad alterum. Ex hoc est quod dicitur communiter quod de hiis omnibus ‘homo est homo’, ‘homo est animal’ possumus loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad esse actuale, et sic sunt false, aut quantum ad esse essentiale, et sic sunt uere. Set reuera neutrum istorum modorum dicitur bene quod essentia alicuius uniuersalis non sit nisi eo existente cuius est essentia. Uniuersale enim non <est> nisi fuerint eius singularia, uel ad minus aliquod singulare, ut iam patebit. Ergo manifestum est quod esse essentie uniuersalis non erit, singularibus destructis eius omnibus.”

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  20. Ibid., f. 50rb25-31: “Item, nullo homine existente, equali ueritate erit hec uera’ sortes est homo’ et ‘homo est homo’, quia nomen indiuidui et nomen speciei ab eadem forma imponuntur. nec differunt aliquo modo nisi sicut signatum et non signatum. Et nomen indiuidui nihil reale addit supra nomen speciei, set ponit modum intelligeni et discretionem puram. Et ideo dixit Boetius quod species est tota essentia indiuidui. Sicut ergo hec ‘homo est homo’ est uera ita quod nulla uerior est illa, quia idem de se predicatur, ita et hec’ sortes est homo’, quia idem de se predicatur.” Cf. also ibid., f. 50va39-43: “Quod cum hoc sit inconueniens, relinquitur quod aliquam formam essentialem non addit singulare supra uniuersale, set solum signatum materie uel discretionem forme.”

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  21. Ibid., f. 50va14-18: “Ex hiis manifestum est quid intendo de ueritate et improbatione. Dico enim quod uera est, nec est ibi aliquod sophisma, et etiam necessaria et qui negat earn negat omne quod demonstratum est in aliqua scientia, ut uisum est.” Accordingly, the distinction between esse actuale and esse essentie holds good for the master; see ibid. f. 50vb26-27: “Dicendum quod sicut duplex est esse, scilicet esse actuale et esse habitudine siue essentie, ita duplex est ens correspondens istis duobus esse…”

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  22. Ibid., f. 51va36-41: “Ad illud quod queritur utrum rebus corruptis termini cadant a suis significatis ego nescio <unde> ista questio uenit, nec uidetur mihi <de>terminabilis. Immo dico simpliciter quod non cadunt a suis significatis, quia sic numquam significaremus nisi quod actu est, et sic ‘chimera’ numquam posset significare. Et constat quod ‘chimera’ ita complete significat sicut ‘homo’, et ‘tragelaphus’ taliter.”

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  23. See above, n. 10.

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  24. See Appendix. The close link between sophisms 2, 12 and 14 of the Munich collection and their Parisian counterparts was kindly pointed out to me by Sten Ebbesen. Cursory examination of the microfilm of the Parisian MS revealed that all but four of the Munich sophisms are strictly related to items of the Parisian collection. A more thorough inquiry is needed in order to establish the exact relationship linking the two collections. On the origin of the sophisms gathered in MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16135 see A. de Libera, “Les Appellationes de Jean le Page”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 51, 1984, pp. 193-225 and de Libera, “La littérature des Sophismata.”

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  25. See de Libera, “La littérature des Sophismata”, p. 217.

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  26. Clm 14522, f. 42rb13-17 (P = MS Paris, B.N. lat. 16135, f. 40rb-va): “Set (+quid P) de ueritate uarie fuerunt opiniones, maxime maximorum. Nam (om. P) quidam (+enim P) uolunt soluere per (+duas P) predictas distinctiones. Quidam enim multum famosus magister de sicca uilla (Quidam … uilla] Quidam autem maximus et famosior tempore nostro uidelicet magister de arida patria P) dixit quod erat [per] falsa per se, uera autem per accidens; et ad hoc induxit (inducebat P) quoddam simile per oppositum.”

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  27. On Seccheville’s life see R.-M. Giguère, Jean de Sècheville, De principiis naturae. Montréal — Paris: Institut d’Études Médiévales — Libr. Philos, J. Vrin 1956, pp. 9-12; A.B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1957-59, vol. III, pp. 1661-2; Lewry, “Oxford Logic”, p. 34.

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  28. Cf. clm 14522, ff. 41va-42ra with Giguère, Jean de Sècheville, pp. 92-7. For the date of this work see ibid., pp. 16-17.

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  29. This date would fit well also with the presence of the exegetical works associated with Adam of Whitby in part 3 of the MS, see above, n. 9. My proposal has an obvious import also concerning the date of the first Parisian collection, which gathers at least ten of the Munich sophisms (see Appendix).

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  30. The four main problems bear the following titles: de distinctione, de veritate, de probatione and de improbatione.

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  31. MS Erfurt, Wiss. Bibl., Ampl. 4° 328, f. 19ra17-23: “OMNIS FENIX EST. Probatio. Cuius contradictoria est falsa, ipsa est uera; et uidetur ibi esse locus a contradictorie oppositis. Quod autem eius contradictoria sit falsa patet; hec enim est sua contradictoria ‘aliqua fenix non est’. Set quod ista sit falsa patet, quia iste terminus ‘fenix’ supponit uerbo de presenti, ergo supponit pro presentibus. Et quia aliqua fenix est presens, ideo ista est falsa ‘aliqua fenix non est’. Et ideo eius contradictoria est uera.”

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  32. Ibid., f. 19ra23-25: “Improbatur sic. Omnis fenix est, ergo plures fenices sunt; et uidetur ibi esse locus ab inferiori ad superius.”

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  33. Ibid., f. 19ra28-42: “Ad hoc sophisma communiter respondetur quod prima est duplex ex eo quod iste terminus ‘fenix’, cum sit terminus communis supponens uerbo de presenti non habens sufficientiam appellatorum, cum multiplicetur a signo uniuersali, potest supponere uel teneri pro suppositis existentibus actu siue pro fenice que est actu. Et tunc est uera … Si autem supponat pro fenicibus existentibus in potentia, sic prima est falsa. Tunc enim, cum iste terminus ‘fenix’ supponat uerbo de presenti, sequeretur iam quod fenix non existens esset, quod falsum est. Et ideo tunc propositio falsa.”

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  34. Generally on the theory of restriction, see A. de Libera, “On some XIIth and XIIIth century Doctrines of Restriction”, Historiographia Linguistica 7/1-2, 1980, pp. 131-43; “Supposition naturelle et appellation: aspects de la semantique parisienne au XIIIe siècle”, Histoire Épistemologie Langage 3/1, 1981, pp. 63-77; and “The Oxford and Paris Traditions in Logic” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann et al., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982, pp. 174-87; C.H. Kneepkens, “‘Omnis homo resurget’: A Note on the Early Restriction Theory and 12th Century Grammar”, in Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics, ed. E.P. Bos, Nijmegen: Ingenium 1985, pp. 93-110.

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  35. L.M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum I: On the Twelfth Century Theories of Fallacies, Assen: Van Gorcum 1962, p. 563 10-32.

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  36. See de Libera, “Les Appellationes”, pp. 228–235, nn. 10-27 (cf. also pp. 203-4); L.M. de Rijk, Peter of Spain. Tractatus, called afterwards Summule logicales, Assen: Van Gorcum 1972, tr. XI. 15, pp. 205-7; John le Page (?), Scriptum super Peryarmenias, MS Padova, Bibl. Univ. 1589, f. 75va-vb; A. de Libera, “Le traité De appellatione de Lambert de Lagny (Lambert d’Auxerre)”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 48, 1981, pp. 227-85, esp. 276-9; A. de Libera, “Les Summulae dialectices de Roger Bacon. I-II. De termino, De enunciatione”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 53, 1986, pp. 139-289, esp. pp. 284-6, nn. 591-606; Anonymous, Sophisma ‘OMN1S FENIX EST’, MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16618, f. 146va-vb; Anonymous, Sophisma ‘OMNIS FENIX EST’, MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16135, f. 15vb-16ra; Anonymous, Sophisma ‘OMNIS FENIX EST’, MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16135, ff. 63vb-64rb and 67rb-va; Anonymous, Sophisma ‘OMNIS FENIX EST’, MS München, Bayer. Staatsbibl., clm 14522, f. 47vb-48ra; Anonymous, Sophisteria Toletana, MS Erfurt, Wiss. Bibl., Ampl. 4°276, f. 23va-vb; Peter of Auvergne, Sophisma ‘OMNIS FENIX EST’, MS Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., S. Croce Plut. 12 sin. 3, f. 68va-vb.

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  37. The legacy of classical mythology concerning the phoenix is conveniently summed up by A. Rusch, article “Phoinix 5”, in Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, vol. XX.39, Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler 1941, col. 414-23.

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  38. S. Brandt, A.M.S. Boethii In Isagogen Porphyrii Editio secunda, Vindobonae — Lipsiae: F. Tempsky — G. Freytag 1906 (CSEL 48), pp. 21419-2158 and 21912-17.

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  39. B. Geyer, Peter Abailards philosophische Schriften. Die Logica “Nostrorum petitioni sociorum”, 2. durchges. u. veränderte Aufl. Münster i.W.: Aschendorff 1973 (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters XXXI,4), p. 54413 ff.

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  40. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum II.1, p. 320 (Ars Meliduna) and II.2, pp. 261, 299 and 301 (Tractatus Anagnini) and S. Ebbesen, K.M. Fredborg, L.O. Nielsen, “Compendium Logicae Porretanum ex codice oxoniensi Collegii Corporis Christi 250: A Manual of Porretan Doctrine by a Pupil of Gilbert’s”, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin 46, 1983, pp. 18 and 66. On the theory of grammaticality sketched in these texts, see S. Ebbesen, “The Present King of France Wears Hypothetical Shoes With Categorical Laces. Twelfth-Century Writers on Well-Formedness”, Medioevo 7, 1981, pp. 91-113, esp. pp. 98-104 on the use of ‘omnis’.

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  41. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum I, p. 563 16-24 (Fallacie Parvipontane) and Logica Modernorum II.2, p. 3392-8 (Tractatus de univocatione monacensis).

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  42. Roger Bacon, Summa de sophismatibus et distinctionibus, ed. R. Steele, in Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, XIV, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1937, pp. 143–149 (and see below n. 55 for the Summulae dialectices); C. Lohr, P. Kunze and B. Müssler, “William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam. Critical Text”, Traditio 39, 1983, pp. 219-99, esp. pp. 272-3, n. 5.3.4 (the author deals with the sophism ‘OMNIS HOMO EST’, but his solution holds good for the case of the phoenix too). For the Magister Abstractionum, see P. Streveler’s contribution in the present volume.

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  43. De Libera, “Les Appellationes”, pp. 238–241, nn. 39-46; de Libera, “Le traité De appellatione de Lambert de Lagny”, pp. 270-6 (Le Page and Lambert deal with ‘OMNIS HOMO EST’); Magister Matheus, Distinctiones “Quoniam ignoratis communibus”, MS Barcelona, Arch. de la Corona de Aragón, Ripoll 109, f. 306rb-307vb; Some Earlier Parisian Tracts on Distinctiones sophismatum, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Nijmegen: Ingenium 1988, p. 75 (Tract. flor. de solut. soph.); Anonymous, Sophisma ‘OMNIS FENIX EST’, MS Vat. lat. 7678, f. 2ra-4va; Anonymous, Sophisteria Toletana, MS Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek der Stadt, Ampl. 4°276, f. 23rb-24rb; Anonymous, Sophisma ‘OMNIS FENIX EST’, MS Paris Bibl. Nat. lat. 16618, f. 145vb-146vb; Anonymous, Sophisma ‘OMNIS FENIX EST’, MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16135, f. 14vb-16rb; Anonymous, Sophisma ‘OMNIS FENIX EST’, MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16135, ff. 62vb-67vb.

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  44. See de Libera’s works cited above n. 34 and also “Le traité De appellatione de Lambert de Lagny”, pp. 241-9.

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  45. Clrn 14522, f. 47va21-24: “Aliter etiam respondetur quod omnis coartatio fit per immediatum; set cum dicitur ulterius quod ‘predicatum non est immediatum cum subiecto”, <tempus> non ipsum immediate restringit, set primo restringit compositionem, compositio uero immediate respiciens extrema restringit ea.” The dictum occurs also e.g. in the anonymous Sophisteria Toletana (MS Erfurt, Wiss. Bibl., Ampl. 4° 276, f. 24ra-rb); it is criticized in the second “phoenix”-sophisma of the Parisian collection (MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16135, ff. 63ra and 66vb).

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  46. On this point see de Libera, “La littérature des Sophismata”, p. 220; the formulations of our sophism are reported below, n. 49.

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  47. Clm 14522, f. 47va28-35: “Nam cum presens ut nunc non accidat uerbo secundum Petrum Heliam, set presens simpliciter; uerbum autem restringit ratione temporis quod sibi accidit; cum presens simpliciter non sit presens existens ut nunc, patet quod uerbum ratione temporis non restringit ad presentes qui sunt, set ad presentes simpliciter. Unde non sequitur uirtute temporis ‘homo currit, ergo homo qui est currit’, set sic ‘homo currit in presenti’, non hoc uel illo; tamen ratione industrie et intellectus apprehenditur res in presenti pro presenti ut nunc, et non pro presenti confuso.”

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  48. Ibid., f. 47va-vb: “Quedam est res uerbi ad cuius esse in presenti sequitur suum subiectum esse in presenti; ideo intellectus rem suppositam respectu talis presentis accipere potest solum pro existenti. Sunt autem alia uerba que significant res ad quarum esse in presenti non requiritur de necessitate subiectum esse in presenti, set indifferenter potest esse tarn ens quam non ens; et ideo tales res supponentes talibus uerbis non determinant acceptionem pro presenti. Talia autem sunt ‘potest’, ‘laudatur’, ‘opinatur’. Ad esse enim potentie in presenti non requiritur subiectum esse in presenti, et ideo ‘potest’ non restringit. Ad esse autem cursus, lectionis, disputationis in presenti requiritur subiectum esse in presenti, et ideo talia uerba restringunt. Per hoc patet causa coartationis in uerbo, quoniam non solum gratia temporis, set gratia rei. Et non solum gratia rei, set quia adhuc operator intellectus acceptiones sic determinans.”

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  49. See J. Pinborg, “Die Logik der Modistae”, Sludia Mediewistyczne 15, 1974, pp. 39–97, esp. 69-70 and “Some Problems of Semantic Representations in Medieval Logic”, in History of Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics, ed. H. Parret, Berlin: De Gruyter 1976, pp. 255-78, esp. p. 263.

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  50. See above, n. 43. De Libera is currently preparing an edition of this sophism, see Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin 59, 1989, p. 115.

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  51. MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16135, f. 65va37-39: “Dicendum est igitur quod aptitudo conuenientie termini causatur ex eis que sunt in termino, scilicet res significata specialis et modus significandi essentialis et modus significandi accidentalis.”

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  52. MS Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., S. Croce Plut. 12 sin. 3, f. 68va: “Si igitur terminus de se non habet quod supponat pro presentibus nec habeat a predicato, uidetur quod nullo modo restringatur. Causa autem quare a predicato non restringitur uidetur esse ista, quoniam omne restringens aliud dicitur esse ut unum extremum (extraneum MS) cum eo et etiam ut unum intellectum aliquo modo cum eo quod restringit. Ea enim que significantur ut unum extremum (extraneum MS) aliquod modo intelliguntur ut unum. Nunc autem predicatum et subiectum, quamquam significentur esse unum, non tarnen ut unum extremum (extraneum MS) nec tarnen uno intellectu concipiuntur, set nec diuersum. Et ita unum non determinat aliud uel restringit ita ut faciat ipsum esse minus quam esset illud.”

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  53. Ibid., f. 68va: “Et ideo dicendum quod terminus supponens uerbo cuicumque cuiuslibet temporis supponit suum significatum et per indifferentiam ad omnia supposita ad que significatum se habet per indifferentiam, siue fuerint presentia uel preterita uel futura. Hoc enim (etiam MS) accidit significato et suppositis termini. Sicut enim significatum alicuius termini non includit aliquod tempus, ita nec suppositum quod dicitur suppositum quia participat significatum per se. Magis tamen est uerum determinate quod terminus aliquis uerbo de presenti supponens, quamquam supponat omnia supposita et per indifferentiam presentia <preterita> et futura, ei tamen denotat inesse predicatum in presenti, ut dicendo ‘omnis homo currit’ omni homini siue presenti siue preterito siue future actribuitur currere in presenti et non in alio tempore; sicut dicendo ‘omnis homo est albus’ denotatur omnem hominem esse album et non nigrum.”

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  54. See Pinborg, “Die Logik der Modistae”, p. 69 n. 105 and “Some Problems of Semantic Representations”, pp. 272-4.

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  55. De Libera, “Les Summulae dialectices de Roger Bacon”, p. 278, nn. 538-41.

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  56. See Braakhuis, “Kilwardby versus Bacon?”. The following is the author’s solution de veritate: “Idcirco dicendum est aliter quod si terminus sit nomen entis solum, ita quod non sit nomen entis nisi equiuoce, tunc prima propositio uera est simpliciter … Si autem terminus sit indifferenter nomen entis et non entis, tunc cum terminus non possit cohartari a tempore consignificato per uerbum nec ratione rei uerbi, ideo supponit tam pro ente quam pro non ente; et ideo quia pro non ente falsa est, ideo dicitur esse falsa, et sic falsa est secundum istam positionem.” (MS Erfurt, Wiss. Bibl., Ampl. 4° 328, f. 26ra-rb)

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  57. S. Brown, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias”, Franciscan Studies 34, 1974, pp. 200–295, esp. 278-95.

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  58. See for instance Ockham, Summa Logicae II.4, Opera Philosophica I, ed. P. Boehner, G. Gàl and S. Brown, St. Bonaventure N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute 1974, pp. 260-2.

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  59. See Brown, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones”, pp. 260–278; it is apparent from p. 260, n. 4.01 that both questions an esse existere sit de essentia rei causatae and de veritate huius ‘omnis phoenix est’ are sections of the same sophism ‘OMNIS PHOENIX EST’. On the metaphysical presuppositions of the theory of restriction see J. Pinborg, “Bezeichnung in der Logik des XIII. Jahrhunderts”, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 8, 1971, pp. 238-81, esp. 249. An analysis of the influence of the Avicennian doctrine of predication — along the lines recently described by A. Bäck, “Avicenna on Existence”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 25/3, 1987, pp. 351-67 — would be of particular importance in this connection.

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    Andrea Tabarroni

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    Stephen Read

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Tabarroni, A. (1993). ‘Omnis phoenix est’: Quantification and Existence in a new sophismata-collection (MS Clm 14522). In: Read, S. (eds) Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 48. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1767-8_10

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