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Archeological Questioning: Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur

  • Burkhard Liebsch
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 129)

Abstract

Before addressing the idea of archeology in the phenomenological perspective of Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, which will be the main concern of my essay, let me first briefly delineate how archeological questioning has gained philosophical significance at all. In the second part of my contribution, I’ll distinguish, at least in a cursory fashion, main directions of archeological thinking in phenomenology. In the third and last part of my considerations, I will focus on one of these directions, namely the one which grew out of an intermingling of phenomenology and psychoanalysis. I will bracket the more fundamental question of whether phenomenology itself must be conceptualized as a sort of archeology.

Keywords

Evolutionary Thinking Positive Science Associative Chain Genetic Phenomenology Past Future 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft,§§80, 82; Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Zweiter Teil (E). On Kant’s role as a contributor to evolutionary thinking, see R. Löw, Philosophie des Lebendigen (Frankfurt 1980), p. 190; E.-M. Engels, Erkenntnis als Anpassung (Frankfurt 1989), pp. 461–2; W. Lepenies, Das Ende der Naturgeschichte (Frankfurt 1978), pp. 38–40; A. Seifert, Cognitio Historica (Berlin 1976), p. 191.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Cf. A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Boston 1933); B. Glass, O. Temkin & W. L. Strauss (eds.), Forerunners of Darwin 1745–1859 (Baltimore 1959).Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Cited in S. Toulmin and J. Goodfield, The Discovery of Time (London 1967), p. 145.Google Scholar
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    Cf. E. Haeckel, Die Welträtsel (Stuttgart 1984), p. 111.Google Scholar
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    See D. Ross, Stanley Hall. Google Scholar
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    J. M. Baldwin, Mental Development in the Child and the Race (New York 1895), p. 28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    This follows from Baldwin’s theory of “genetic modes”, which he developed in accordance with an ontogenetic application of evolutionary thinking. Here, however, it is not possible to explain at length the outlines of this theory; cf. J. M. Baldwin, “The Origin of a ‘Thing’ and its Nature”, Psychological Review (1895), pp. 551–573; Development and Evolution (New York 1902).Google Scholar
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    Cf. A. Vergote (see ann. 5), p. 496; S. Bernfeld & S. Cassirer-Bernfeld, Bausteine der Freud-Biographik (Frankfurt 1988), p. 237; S. Freud, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse (Frankfurt 1969), p. 204; Zwang, Paranoia und Perversion (Frankfurt 1973), p. 203.Google Scholar
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    S. Freud, Hysterie und Angst (Frankfurt 1971), p. 54.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., pp. 59–60; cf. A. Grünbaum, Die Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse (Stuttgart 1988), p. 437.Google Scholar
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    Freud, Hysterie und Angst, p. 60.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., pp. 242, 245, 252; cf. L. Landgrebe, “Lebenswelt und Geschichtlichkeit des menschlichen Daseins”, in B. Waldenfels, J. M. Broekman and A. Pai:anin (eds.), Phänomenologie und Marxismus (Frankfurt 1977), Bd. 2, pp. 53–55.Google Scholar
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    “Phänomenologische Archäologie, das Aufgraben der in ihren Baugliedern verborgenen konstitutiven Bauten, der Bauten apperzeptiver Sinnesleistungen, die uns fertig vorliegen als Erfahrungswelt. Das Zurückfragen und dann Bloßlegen der Seinssinn schaffenden Einzelleistungen bis zu den letzten, den ‘Archai’, um von diesen aufwärts im Geist entstehen zu lassen die selbstverständliche Einheit der so vielfach fundierten Seinsgeltungen […] Wie bei der gewöhnlichen Archäologie: Rekonstruktion, Verstehen im ‘Zick-Zack’ !” (Cited in A. Diemer, Edmund Husserl [Meisenheim am Glan 19652], p. 11.) Husserl’s still unedited manuscript “Phänomenologische Archäologie” bears the number C 16 VI (Husserl-Archives, Leuven); Merleau-Ponty refers to the notion of archeology in his Éloge de la philosophie, in his preface to A. Hesnard, L’cruvre de Freud et son importance pour le monde moderne (Paris 1960), pp. 5–10, and in Le philosophe et son ombre. Google Scholar
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    Cf. R. Bernet’s preface to the German edition of J. Derrida, Husserls Weg in die Geschichte am Leitfaden der Geometrie (München 1987), p. 16, and, in Derrida’s text, p. 67; E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (Hamburg 1982), p. 63 (= § 9,1); P. Thévenaz, De Husserl à Merleau-Ponty (Neuchâtel 1966), p. 37.Google Scholar
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    Cf. A. Vergote (see ann. 5), p. 501. This problem pervades especially Husserl’s late genealogy of experience; cf. Erfahrung und Urteil (Hamburg 1985), §11.Google Scholar
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    Cf. “Un inédit de M. Merleau-Ponty”, in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 67 (1962), pp. 401–49; Vorlesungen I (Berlin, New York 1973), p. 5.Google Scholar
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    M. Merleau-Ponty, Le philosophe et son ombre, in Signes (Paris 1960), p. 208. cf. Das Auge und der Geist (Hamburg 1984), p. 50.Google Scholar
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    M. Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et l’invisible (Paris 1964), p. 211; cf. Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare (München 1986), p. 208.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Cf. B. Waldenfels, “Phänomenologie unter eidetischen, transzendentalen und strukturalen Gesichtspunkten”, in M. Herzog & C. F. Graumann (eds.), Sinn und Erfahrung (Heidelberg 1991), p. 75.Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Cf. P. Ricoeur, Finitude et culpabilité, T II, 1. L’homme faillible (Paris 1960), pp. 44–6. cf. Die Fehlbarkeit des Menschen (München 1971), pp. 46–49. P. Ricoeur, “New Developments in Phenomenology in France: the Phenomenology of Language”, Social Research 34, no. 1 (1967), pp. 1–39; “Philosophie et langage”, in R. Klibansky (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy in France. Philosophie contemporaine (Firenze 1969), pp. 272–295; A l’école de la phénoménologie (Paris 1986), pp. 9–14.Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Cf. annotation 15.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    A. de Waelhens, “Réflexions sur les rapports de la phénoménologie et de la psychoanalyse”, Existence et signification (1959), pp. 191–213 (cf. p. 200). See also P. Ricoeur, Die Interpretation, p. 391.Google Scholar
  25. 25.
  26. 26.
    Ibid., pp. 468, 396.Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    Ibid., p. 350.Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    Ibid., pp. 429–504.Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    “M. Merleau-Ponty à la Sorbonne. Résumé de ses cours établi par des étudiants et approuvé par lui-même”. Bulletin de Psychologie, no. 236, (1964) I. XVIII, 3–6, p. 311.Google Scholar
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    Cf. P. Ricoeur, “Hegel aujourd’hui”, Etudes théologiques et réligieuses 49 (1974), no. 3, p. 347, Die Interpretation, pp. 475, 479.Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    Ricoeur, “Hegel aujourd’hui”, p. 347; cf. Hermeneutik und Strukturalismus (München 1973), p. 33; Le conflit des interpretations (Paris 1969), p. 25. (In the following annotations, the italicized references refer to the original editions).Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    Ibid., pp. 145/239.Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    Ibid. Ricoeur seems thereby to imply that the unconscious forever keeps the “bodily origins of sense” in a distance which no striving for a reappropriate existence could overcome.Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    Ricoeur, Die Interpretation, p. 475.Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    H. Arendt, Das Leben des Geistes,Bd. 2, Das Wollen (München, Zürich 1989), p. 133.Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, Die Prosa der Welt (München 1984), pp. 69–133/66–160.Google Scholar
  37. 37.
    Ricoeur, Zeit und Erzählung (München 1991), Bd. 3, pp. 232–4/211–2, 396–8/355–9, 437/392. These doubts finally lead to the notion of ipséité as an itself temporalized structure of existence — in contrast to any substantialist notion of being a self.Google Scholar
  38. 38.
    In this context, Ricoeur claims that an “ontology of past future(s)” must be developed; cf. Zeit und Erzählung, Bd. 1, pp. 236/222–3, 240/226, 281/263, Bd. 2, pp. 69/63–4. See also B. Groethuysen, “De quelques aspects du temps”, Recherches philosophiques. T. V (1935/6), pp. 139–195; H. R. Jauss, Zeit und Erinnerung in Marcel Prousts ‘A la recherche du temps perdu’ (Frankfurt 1986), pp. 23–5.Google Scholar
  39. 39.
    Zeit und Erzählung, Bd. 2, pp. 25/26–7. Google Scholar
  40. 40.
    Ibid., p. 41/40.Google Scholar
  41. 41.
    P. Ricoeur, “The Human Experience of Time and Narrative”, Research in Phenomenology IX (1979), pp. 17–34 (cf. pp. 331–2). To this idea corresponds the conception of a ’reflective philosophy“, which Ricoeur borrowed from Jean Nabert (cf. Die Interpretation, pp. 58–9). Referring to Nabert, Ricoeur keeps up the ideal of reflection as carrying with it ”the desire for absolute transparence, a perfect coincidence of the self with itself […]“ It is this ideal, however, which phenomenology and hermeneutics ”continue to project onto an ever more distant horizon […1“ On a personal level, the striving for the realization of a ”repetition“, which may verify itself through archeological working-through of one’s history, seems to be the equivalent of philosophical ”reflection“; cf. P. Ricoeur, ”On Interpretation“, in A. Montefiore (ed.), Philosophy in France Today (Cambridge 1983), p. 188.Google Scholar
  42. 42.
    M. Merleau-Ponty, Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung (Berlin 1966), Dritter Teil, §§14–15/pp. 469–495.Google Scholar
  43. 43.
    Cited from the Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London 1962), p. 346.Google Scholar
  44. 44.
    This statement stresses a problem and is not to be understood as a final judgment about Ricoeur’s thinking about the relation of archeology and teleology.Google Scholar

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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1993

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  • Burkhard Liebsch

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