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Abstract

Electric utilities throughout the world continue to face new challenges involving ownership, market structure, and regulation. The papers included in this volume bear directly on three related issues: (1) Should ownership be private or public? (2) What operations should be integrated, and where is competition feasible? (3) Where is regulation necessary, and can it be made more efficient?

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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Einhorn, M.A. (1994). Introduction. In: Einhorn, M.A. (eds) From Regulation to Competition: New frontiers in electricity markets. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1368-7_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1368-7_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4598-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-011-1368-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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