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Regulative Ideas or Sense-Events? An Attempt to Determine the Logos of Hermeneutics

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The Question of Hermeneutics

Part of the book series: Contributions to Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 17))

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Abstract

The question of the relation between hermeneutics and practical philosophy is one which poses a challenge for the contemporary philosophical situation. This way of posing the problem provides one of the two stimuli for my attempt to determine the logos of hermeneutics. The other resides in the fact that in contemporary philosophy, a tendency has persisted for quite some time to define the internal relationship between hermeneutics and practical reason in such a way that one is no longer able to identify [the element of] practical reason therein.

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Notes

  1. To this point — and that means in the rejection of the attempt at a scientific reduction of understanding to a heuristic moment of the context of the nomological (causal or statistical) explanation of acts as events — there is certainly agreement between H.-G. Gadamer, J. Habermas, and myself.

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  2. See H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (Tubingen: Mohr, 1960), critical discussion thereof in K.-0. Apel, Transformation der Philosophie (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1973), Bd. I, Introduction, note 70.

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  3. See G. F. Lyotard, “Histoire universelle et differences culturelles,” in Critique 456 (1985), p. 559ff., where the paradigm of the superseded historical-philosophical idea of progress is even traced directly to Kant. Hans Jonas, in his Prinzip Verantwortung, also detects — in my view unjustly — in Kant’s ethically grounded regulative idea of possible progress a mere preparatory stage of the Hegelian and Marxist conception of the intelligibly necessary (progressive) course of history. See Jonas, Prinzip Verantwortung (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1980), p. 227ff.

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  4. See L Kant: “Das mag im das Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fuer die Praxis,” Akademie Edition (Berlin: de Gruyter), Bd. VIII, p. 308ff.

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  5. See, for example, R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), and Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).

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  6. See Philippe Forget, ed., Text und Interpretation (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1984).

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  7. On Heidegger and Derrida see J. Habermas: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1985), chapters VI and VII, as well as K.-O. Apel, “Die Herausforderung der totalen Vernunftkritik und das Programm einer philosophischen Theorie der Rationalistatstypen,” in Concordia 11(1987): pp. 2–23; in French translation in Le Debat (1988).

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  8. See Derrida’s contributions in Ph. Forget, ed., Text und Interpretation (see note 6).

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  9. See H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 218ff.

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  10. Ibid., p. 326f.

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  11. Ibid., p. 327.

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  12. Ibid., p. 3.

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  13. See for example K.-O. Apel: “Szientismus oder transzendentale Hermeneutik?” in: R. Bubner et. al., eds., Hermeneutik und Dialektik, Festschrift fur H.-G. Gadamer (Tübingen: Mohr, 1970), Bd. I, pp. 105–45

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  14. K.-O. Apel: Die Idee der Sprache in der Tradition des Humanismus von Dante bis Vico (Bonn: Bouvier, 1963, 1980).

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  15. See note 5.

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  16. See M. Heidegger: Being and Time (Halle: Niemeyer, 1941), pp. 153 and 314f.

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  17. See especially K.-O. Apel: Die Erklaeren: Verstehen-Kontroverse in transzendentalpragmatischer Sicht (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1979); English translation: Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental Pragamatic Perspective (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984).

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  18. See in this connection most recently K.-O. Apel: “The ‘Erklaeren/Verstehen’ — Controversy in the Philosophy of the Human and Natural Sciences” in G. Floisstad, ed., Contemporary Philosophy. A New Survey, vol. II (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 19–50, as well as the same author, “Diltheys Unterscheidung von ‘Erklaeren’ und ‘Verstehen’ im lichte der Ergebnisse der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie” in E. W. Orth, ed., Dilthey und die Philosophie des Gegenwart (Freiburg i. Br.: Alber, 1985), pp. 285–347.

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  19. See J. Habermas: Erkenntnis und Interesse (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1968); English trans.: Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), as well as K.-0. Apel, “Szientistik, Hermeneutik, Ideologiekritik,” in Apel, Transformation der Philosophie (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1973), Bd. II, pp. 96–127; English trans., Towards a Transformation of Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1980), and Apel, “Types of Social Science in Light of Human Cognitive Interests” in Social Research 44 (1977), pp. 425–70, reprinted in St. Brown, ed., Philosophical Disputes in the Social Sciences (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979), as well as Apel, Die Erklaeren: Verstehen-Kontroverse in transzendentalpragmatischer sicht (see note 17).

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  20. See the discussion volume Hermeneutik und Ideologie-Kritik (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1971).

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  21. . See J. Habermas/N. Luhmann: Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie? (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1971); further J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1981), Bd. II: “Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft.” English trans., Theory of Communicative Action, vol. two (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).

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  22. Concerning the following, see note 7.

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  23. On Peirce’s philosophy see K.-O. Apel, Der Denkweg von Charles Sanders Peirce — Eine Einfuehrung in den amerikanischen Pragmatismus (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1975) (English translation: Charles S. Pierce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism (Amherst, Mass.: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1981) as well as from the same author, “Peirce and Post-Kantian Truth,” in E. Freeman, ed., The Relevance of Charles Peirce (LaSalle, The Hegeler Inst., 1983), pp. 189–223; and “Linguistic Meaning and Intentionality. The Compatibility of the ‘Linguistic-Turn’ and the ‘Pragmatic Turn’ of Meaning-Theory within the Framework of a Transcendental Semiotics,” in H. Silverman and D. Welton, eds., Critical and Dialectical Phenomenology (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 1987), pp. 2–53.

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  24. See K.-O. Apel, “Das Problem der Philosophischen Letztbegruendung im Lichte einer transzendentalen Sprachpragmatik: Versuch einer Metakritik des ‘Kritischen Rationalismus’” in B. Kanitschneider, ed., Sprache und Erkenntnis. Festschrift for G. Frey (Innsbruck, 1976), pp. 55–82; English Translation in Man and World, vol. 8 (1975), pp. 238–75, reprinted in K. Baynes et al., eds., After Philosophy. End or Transformation? (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 250–90. See further: W. Kuhlmann, Reflexive Letztbegrundung. Untersuchungen zur Transzendentalpragmatik(Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 1985); D. Böhler, Rekonstruktive Pragmatik. Von der Bewusstseinsphilosophie zur Kommunikationsreflexion (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1985), as well as most recently: K.-O. Apel, “Fallibilismus, Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit und Letztbegruendung,” in Forum fur Philosophie Bad Hamburg: Philosophie und Begruendung (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1987), pp. 116–277.

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  25. See K.-O. Apel, “Die Logosauszeichnung der menschlichen Sprache. Die philosophische Tragweite der Sprechakttheorie,” in M. -G. Bosshardt, ed., Sprache Interdisziplinaer (Berlin/New York: W. de Gruyter, 1986).

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  26. See J. Habermas, “Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz,” in J. Habermas /N. Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?, op. cit., note 21, pp. 101–141; by the same author: “Was heisst Universalpragmatik?” in K.-O. Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), pp. 174–272; by the same author: Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, op. cit., note 21, Bd. I, Kap. III, as well my work cited on note 217 25.

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  27. Concerning the necessary presupposition of contingent psychic and in particular historical presuppositions of world-understanding there is at present a widespread consensus among philosophers, originating with Collingwood, Wittgenstein, Searle, Heidegger and Gadamer. That there are also non-contingent — that is, argumentatively indisputable and to that extent universally valid —presuppositions of sensible argumentation, seems to most something easy to question — although every questioning as argumentation must obviously involve validity claims.

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  28. See K.-O. Apel, “Die Herausforderung der totalen Vernunftkritik…” See note 7.

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  29. See note 26.

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  30. See the contributions from KM. Apel and J. Habermas in K. -O. Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie, see note 26; further K.-O. Apel, ed., “Fallibilismus, Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit und Letztbegrundung,” op. cit., note 24, as well as W. Kuhlmann, “Philosophie und rekonstruktive Wissenschaft” in Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung, 40 (1986), pp. 224–334.

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  31. See KM. Apel, “Die transzendentalpragmatische Begründung der Kommunikationsethik und das Problem der hoechsten Stufe einer Entwicklungslogik des moralischen Bewusstseins,” in: K.-O. Apel, Diskurs und Verantwortung(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988), p. 306ff.

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  32. See K.-O. Apel, Die Erklaeren: Verstehen - Kontroverse in transzendentalpragmatischer Sicht, see note 17.

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  33. See I. Lakatos, “Die Geschichte der Wissenschaft und ihre rationalen Nachkonstruktionen,” in W. Diederich, ed., Theorien der Wissenschaftsgeschichte (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1974), pp. 55–119.

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  34. See K.-O. Apel, “Die Herausforderung der totalen Vernunftkritik.”, see note 7.

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  1. Karl-Otto Apel
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  1. Loyola College in Maryland, USA

    Timothy J. Stapleton

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Apel, KO. (1994). Regulative Ideas or Sense-Events? An Attempt to Determine the Logos of Hermeneutics. In: Stapleton, T.J. (eds) The Question of Hermeneutics. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1160-7_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1160-7_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-2964-0

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