Abstract
The use of the atmosphere as a dumping place for greenhouse gases has been a matter of laissez faire. Proposals for an international agreement to restrict the rate of such emissions are, in effect, proposals for collectively determined controls. The alternative proposed here would combine collective control with “nationalization” of emission rights. Nationalization would give each country a share in the global carrying capacity and allow each country to determine the timing and best use of its share. However, the externalities involved in national decisions would still require some international coordination.
This paper is an extensive revision of a paper previously circulated under the title, “Central Issues in Greenhouse Warming Negotiations.” The research on which this paper is based was supported by the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, The Rockefeller Foundation and the National Science Foundation. None of these organizations bears any responsibility for its contents, however.
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Eckaus, R.S. (1994). Laissez Faire or Nationalization and Collective Control of the Global Commons. In: Carraro, C. (eds) Trade, Innovation, Environment. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Series on Economics, Energy and Environment, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0948-2_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0948-2_12
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