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Biology as Society, Society as Biology: Metaphors pp 11–35Cite as

Who is Afraid of Metaphors?

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Part of the book series: Sociology of the Sciences ((SOSC,volume 18))

Abstract

Judging from this quote, Charles Darwin certainly was not afraid of metaphors and seemed to be convinced that no one should be. Against the background of such an innocent approach the recent flood of publications on the notion of metaphor appears to be rather mysterious. Indeed, a look at the bibliographies of metaphors compiled by Noppen and others in 1985 and 1990 provides a first insight into what Noppen calls the “metaphormania” of the intellectuals since the 1970s.2 Although both bibliographies are not considered exhaustive, they already contain more than 6,000 entries; the recommendations for beginners alone amount to more than 200 entries. Not only is the sheer amount of publications impressive but so is the variety of disciplines and research areas covered by them: pertinent studies are to be found in linguistics, semiotics, rhetoric, literature, as well as in philosophy, psychology, sociology, history, political sciences, medicine, or artificial intelligence.

“Every one knows what is meant and implied by... metaphorical expressions, and they are almost necessary for brevity.”1

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Notes

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  5. Generally, the relationship between literature and science manifests itself mainly in two ways: 1) as an exchange of concepts across the boundaries of the different types of discourse; and 2) through its literary usage the metaphor provides, implicitly or explicitly, a model also for scientific use. As far as the extent and recognition of the transfer of individual concepts between science and literature is concerned, both are subject to continuous change. Until the mid-19th century, no rigid boundary existed between men of letters and scientists. Beer, for instance, discusses Darwins’s influences on the literature of Kingsley, G. Eliot, and Hardy (Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots. Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction (London: Routledge & Paul, 1983) p. 5. In turn, Darwin based his insights, inter alia, on Malthus’s On Population as well as on Beagle: The Poetical Works of John Milton

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  1. University of Bielefeld, Germany

    Sabine Maasen

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  1. Sabine Maasen
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  1. University of Bielefeld, Germany

    Sabine Maasen  & Peter Weingart  & 

  2. Harvard University, USA

    Everett Mendelsohn

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Maasen, S. (1995). Who is Afraid of Metaphors?. In: Maasen, S., Mendelsohn, E., Weingart, P. (eds) Biology as Society, Society as Biology: Metaphors. Sociology of the Sciences, vol 18. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0673-3_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0673-3_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-0251-9

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