Art as a Product of Nature as a Work of Art

  • Paul Feyerabend
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 165)


It seems that the sciences and the arts are no longer as sharply separated as they were only thirty years ago. It is now quite fashionable to speak of scientific creativity and of the thought that enters into a work of art. Computer art, fractals, electronic music, film, debates about the role of metaphor and imagery, the whole enterprise of deconstruction have further lessened the urge for precise classifications. Yet the remaining differences are enormous. Scientists may rhapsodize about the unity of all human efforts; they may redden with excitement when speaking about the artistic aspects of scientific research: but their tolerance vanishes when the aspects become real, enter their laboratories and wish to be heard. And where is the scientist who would permit good, solid science money (such as a small percentage of the hundreds of millions that keep flowing into the Human Genome Project or of the billions that had originally been promised to the Texas Supercollider) to be spent on an examination of, say, La Monte Young’s music? Conversely, where is the artist, or the art commission ready to fund a new and revolutionary science project? Even social scientists who, after all, are dealing with people and who occasionally support the efforts of special cultures insist on objectivity and write in a severely impersonal style.


Planetary System Human Genome Project Perpetual Motion Electronic Music Modem Science 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul Feyerabend
    • 1
  1. 1.MeilenSwitzerland

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