Dialectical Logic as the General Logic of Temporalization
Aristotle defined time as the measure of motion according to a before and an after, from which it follows that the instant wherein that measure is determined by the hand of a clock, presents itself as a limit which separates the past from the future, and at the same time possibly connects them by simple contiguity, in such a way that that instant remains immobile in its punctual instantaneity. This immobility of the instant as such, renders the motion of things incomprehensible, seeing that this motion should necessarily coincide with an infinity of purely static positions. It is clear that the point in time is but an abstraction, albeit a necessary one for measurement. But to define the instant as a point is to reify an abstraction which amounts to a suppression of the future itself.
KeywordsGeneral Logic Communal Land Agricultural Commune Ultimate Truth Ancient Society
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