Abstract
The notion of explanation has figured centrally in most contemporary accounts of scientific knowledge and rational belief. Explanation is usually cited, along with prediction, as one of the two principal functions of our factual beliefs. And the rationality of such beliefs is commonly said to be measured, at least in part, by the relative range or quality of the explanations they make possible. If something like this is correct, then it is important for us to try to understand what explanation is, and what distinguishes a good explanation from a poor one.
This paper was first presented at the Jagellonian University, Krakow, and first published as chapter 10 of P.M. Churchland (1989).
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Churchland, P.M. (1995). On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach. In: Misiek, J. (eds) The Problem of Rationality in Science and its Philosophy. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 160. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0461-6_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0461-6_6
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