Self-Narratives as Personal Structures of Meaning

Abstract

The question of “self” is put on the psychological agenda as soon as people start reflecting upon themselves. Trying to find an answer to questions like “who am I?” or “what am I?” implies a cognitive operation which results in the attribution of meaning to oneself as a person. But answering the identity question is rather difficult for two reasons. The first one is concerned with the paradoxical aspects of “self.” When individuals want to define who they are as a person, they are inevitably caught between a need to belong and a need to be distinct. Identities are partly determined by groups one does belong to, or wants to belong to. At the same time, however, individuals are more than group members. In order to sustain their individuality, they have to differentiate themselves from other people (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). This results in a complex negotiation between belonging and being unique, because the practical implications are in conflict more often than not (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985). The “self” is further hindered by a paradox that appears diachronically. On the one hand, the “self” is assumed to provide personal stability across a variety of situations, but on the other hand, the “self” is assumed to be dynamic. The sense of stability may be put at risk when individuals start to develop, or actualize themselves. These two paradoxes demand a subtle conceptualization of “self”that can cope with the conflicting demands.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the NATO workshop. Several participants shared their thoughtful comments with me. Thanks are expressed to Harke Bosma, Michael Chandler, Brigitte Pörzgen, Fred Strayer, Jerzy Trzebinski, and Anna Kwiatkowska. The editors are kindly acknowledged for their contribution to the final version. Ms. A.J.S. Fischer-Vahl is thanked for her work on the improvement of the author’s English.