Perceptual facts known to the perceiver immediately upon occurrence fall into two classes: those that he knows inferentially and those that he knows non-inferentially. This classification does not necessarily exhaust the domain of perceptual facts: it is possible for a perceptual fact to be unknown to its subject at the time it occurs.
KeywordsVisual Experience Visual Sensation Perceptual Knowledge Present Point Perceptual Fact
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.As some do. See, for example, Armstrong (1961), p. 191, Hamlyn (1957), p. 110, Hamlyn (1961), p. 196 and Chisholm (1957), p. 3.Google Scholar
- 2.This point and ones in the next paragraph were brought home to me by Collins (1967).Google Scholar
- 3.For a full and interesting discussion of the conditions of seeing that p see Dretske (1969).Google Scholar
- 5.Put forward by Berkeley (see Principles of Human Knowledge, I: 3, 58) and many philosophers since, for example: J. S. Mill (1865), Ch. 11 and Appendix to Ch. 12, Russell (1914a and 1914b), Lewis ( 1947 ), Chs. VI–IX, and Ayer (1947).Google Scholar
- 7.Criticisms of phenomenalism similar to those that I have given, and some others as well, are presented in Armstrong (1961), Chs. 5 and 6.Google Scholar