Advertisement

Perceptual Knowledge

  • Carl Ginet
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy book series (PSSP, volume 5)

Abstract

Perceptual facts known to the perceiver immediately upon occurrence fall into two classes: those that he knows inferentially and those that he knows non-inferentially. This classification does not necessarily exhaust the domain of perceptual facts: it is possible for a perceptual fact to be unknown to its subject at the time it occurs.

Keywords

Visual Experience Visual Sensation Perceptual Knowledge Present Point Perceptual Fact 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. 1.
    As some do. See, for example, Armstrong (1961), p. 191, Hamlyn (1957), p. 110, Hamlyn (1961), p. 196 and Chisholm (1957), p. 3.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    This point and ones in the next paragraph were brought home to me by Collins (1967).Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    For a full and interesting discussion of the conditions of seeing that p see Dretske (1969).Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    Put forward by Berkeley (see Principles of Human Knowledge, I: 3, 58) and many philosophers since, for example: J. S. Mill (1865), Ch. 11 and Appendix to Ch. 12, Russell (1914a and 1914b), Lewis ( 1947 ), Chs. VI–IX, and Ayer (1947).Google Scholar
  5. 7.
    Criticisms of phenomenalism similar to those that I have given, and some others as well, are presented in Armstrong (1961), Chs. 5 and 6.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1975

Authors and Affiliations

  • Carl Ginet
    • 1
  1. 1.Cornell UniversityIthacaUSA

Personalised recommendations