Abstract
Recent papers by Simon (1957), by March (1955, 1957), and by Dahl (1957) have suggested measuring person A’s power over person B in terms of its actual or potential effects, that is, in terms of the changes that A causes or can cause in Bs behavior.1 As Dahl puts it, A has power over B to the extent to which ‘he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (1957, p. 203).
Behavioral Science, 7 (1962), 67–80.
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References
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© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Harsanyi, J.C. (1980). Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games. In: Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation. Theory and Decision Library, vol 12. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9327-9_9
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