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Towards an Economic Theory of Organization and Information (1954)

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Part of the Theory and Decision Library book series (TDLU,volume 7-2)

Abstract

The statement of Laplace [9] that the theory of probabilities is at bottom merely common sense reduced to calculus1 and the saying of Schumpeter [18] that, to a layman, economics must appear halb unverstaendlich, halb selbstverstaendlich, have similar meanings. Both men said, in effect, that their respective disciplines formalized certain concepts and propositions of pre-scientific practice. Surely this did not lead them to think that their disciplines were useless. In fact, both disciplines have been fairly successful.

Keywords

  • Payoff Function
  • Expected Utility
  • Expected Profit
  • Good Rule
  • Utility Scale

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Research undertaken by the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics under contract Nonr.-358 (01), NR 047–006 with the Office of Naval Research. The bulk of the paper was written in December 1952. Its revision in August 1953 was part of the author’s work at the Institute for Numerical Analysis under a contract between the National Bureau of Standards and the University of California, supported in part by the Air Research and Development Command, USAF.

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© 1974 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Marshak, J. (1974). Towards an Economic Theory of Organization and Information (1954). In: Economic Information, Decision, and Prediction. Theory and Decision Library, vol 7-2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9278-4_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9278-4_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1196-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-9278-4

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