Epistemic Values and Epistemic Viewpoints
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Chisholm suggests that the understanding and interpretation of various epistemic expressions may be best achieved by taking as a primitive a relation that is essentially evaluative in character. In Perceiving he bases his account on the relation of being-more-worthy-of-belief. Elsewhere, the relation of being-more-reasonable-than and the relation of beingepistemically-preferable-to are chosen.1 We undertake here a similar project. Our choice of such a primitive relation will turn out to be only slightly different from Chisholm’s, and this difference arises from our attempt here to provide a somewhat more general account of epistemic expressions than the ones Chisholm provides.
KeywordsModal Logic Logical Truth Propositional Knowledge Doxastic Attitude Doxastic State
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