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Epistemic Values and Epistemic Viewpoints

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Analysis and Metaphysics

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy ((PSSP,volume 4))

Abstract

Chisholm suggests that the understanding and interpretation of various epistemic expressions may be best achieved by taking as a primitive a relation that is essentially evaluative in character. In Perceiving he bases his account on the relation of being-more-worthy-of-belief. Elsewhere, the relation of being-more-reasonable-than and the relation of beingepistemically-preferable-to are chosen.1 We undertake here a similar project. Our choice of such a primitive relation will turn out to be only slightly different from Chisholm’s, and this difference arises from our attempt here to provide a somewhat more general account of epistemic expressions than the ones Chisholm provides.

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References

  • Chisholm, R. M., ‘On the Nature of Empirical Evidence’, in Empirical Knowledge, ed. by R. M. Chisholm and R. Swartz, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1973.

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© 1975 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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Keim, R. (1975). Epistemic Values and Epistemic Viewpoints. In: Lehrer, K. (eds) Analysis and Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9098-8_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9098-8_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1193-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-9098-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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