Definitive Politics

Abstract

The role of pity on the part of philosophers and scientists, who look at the valleys of ignorance somewhat as the saved look at the damned, must tell us something of the inequalities of the perfect order of Bensalem. It is fairly certain that the fellows of Solomon’s House, though they may pity the other inhabitants of Bensalem and they certainly may pity the uncivilized continent of Europe, do not pity one another. Their pity, at least, implies inequality. The moral principles which have so far been discussed bear a particular relation to the aristocracy of experts, the fellows of Solomon’s House. The regime in which they rule must, however, be one in which the common people too have certain moral principles derived from the nature, if not of the cosmos, then of the initial appetites. To see what those principles may be, let us turn again to the fable of Dionysus. ¹ There are two versions of this fable in Bacon’s work. As each of them omits something of the other, however, it is necessary to seek the true meaning, to combine them both. Bacon says that nothing better in moral philosophy may be “contrived,” ² than the fable of Dionysus. Superlatives are not uncommon in Bacon, but it is worthy of remark that the fable which is as good a contrivance or discovery as any in moral philosophy, is one that deals with the passions in their most unrestrained state.