Can we use the History of Science to Decide between Competing Methodologies

Abstract

How are we to decide between the different methodologies that have been proposed for science? In particular, how are we to decide between in- ductivism, conventionalism, falsificationism, and research programism? Lakatos says that we should use history of science to help us decide. He proposes, or at any rate seems to propose, the following criterion: Given competing methodologies we should prefer that methodology according to which more of the actual history of science is internal and rational, and more of scientists’ own judgments about science are correct. This criterion presupposes the following proposition, which Lakatos also asserts: The different methodologies lead to determinable and different dividing lines between internal (rational) history of science and external (empirical) history of science. I have doubts about both of these, the criterion and the proposition presupposed by it, and therefore I have doubts about whether history of science can be used as Lakatos proposes to judge between different methodologies.1 I shall indicate what my doubts are, starting first with the proposition that the different methodologies lead to deter-minable and different dividing lines between internal and external history of science.