Abstract
The doctrine of freewill implies that we may, if we choose, do the thing which we less want to do. Of course, there is some sense in which it is true that if we do so act, then that itself shows that we more wanted to do what we less wanted to do.
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References
Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. T. K. Abbott ( N.Y.: The Liberal Arts Press, 1949 ), p. 17.
On this subject see Sidney Hook, “Necessity, Indeterminism, and Sentamentalism,” in Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modem Science, Sidney Hook, ed. (N.Y.: Collier Books 1961), pp. 187ff. And see P. H. Nowell-Smith’s Ethics, 1954, p. 286.
C. A. Campbell, Selfhood and Godhood ( N.Y.: The Macmillan Co., 1957 ), pp. 169f.
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© 1971 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Davis, W.H. (1971). Self-Transcendence. In: The Freewill Question. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3020-5_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3020-5_9
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