Critical Remarks

  • Richard M. Zaner
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 17)


With a theory as complex and intricate as Merleau-Ponty’s, one has the feeling that any critical remarks he might venture will appear either too sweeping, or too trivial to matter much one way or the other. We have attempted thus far to brave one torrent — explicating the theory itself — only to encounter another, more difficult one.


Corporeal Scheme Mental Life Critical Remark Internal Time Phenomenological Reduction 
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  1. 1.
    Cartesian Meditations, op, cit., p. 37.Google Scholar
  2. 1.
    Formale und transzendentale Logik, op. cit., pp. 187, 221–22; Cartesian Meditations pp. 46–55; Ideen, I, p. 94.Google Scholar
  3. 1.
    Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 34. And, we contend Merleau-Ponty sees the task of reflection as having of necessity to repeat the process reflected on, thus confusing reflection with the process itself.Google Scholar
  4. 2.
    Cf. above, pp. 130–35.Google Scholar
  5. 2.
    Cf. PP, pp. 237ff, 269ff, 275–76, 350–51, 376–77, and passim. 8 Gurwitsch, Théorie du Champ de la Conscience, op. cit., p. 245.Google Scholar
  6. 1.
    Cf. Erfahrung und Urteil, op. cit., § 17; these are the lowest levels of ego-activity. See also Ideen, I, op. cit., § 115.Google Scholar
  7. 1.
    Cf. Cartesian Meditations, pp. 41–44, e.g.Google Scholar
  8. 1.
    See H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague, Netherlands), Volume I, p. 184.Google Scholar
  9. 1.
    Gurwitsch, ibid., pp. 75, 87.Google Scholar
  10. 2.
    Spiegelberg, op. cit., p. III.Google Scholar
  11. 3.
    Gurwitsch, op. cit., p. 87.Google Scholar
  12. 1.
    Gurwitsch, ibid., pp. 75–76.Google Scholar
  13. 1.
    Cf. Formale und transzendentale Logik, §§ 3–4. We shall return to this phenomenon later on.Google Scholar
  14. 2.
    Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 78.Google Scholar
  15. 3.
    Erfahrung und Urteil, op. cit., §§ 16–21, and 63.Google Scholar
  16. 1.
    Cf. de Waelhens, op. cit., pp. 8, and 109–10. The remark is to the effect that Merleau-Ponty, as opposed to Sartre (Marcel is not even mentioned), accounts for the body qua mine.Google Scholar
  17. 1.
    A. Schütz, “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action,” PPR, Vol. xiv, No. 1 (September, 1953), p. 5; also, pp. 3–6. Cf. also his excellent article, “Symbol, Reality and Society,” Symbols and Society (edited by Lyman Bryson et al), 14th Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion (New York, 1955), pp. 152–54. And, “Type and Eidos in Husserl’s Late Philosophy,” PPR, Vol. xx, No. 2 (December, 1959), pp. 147–65.Google Scholar
  18. 1.
    Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., §§ 39 and 51.Google Scholar
  19. 1.
    Ibid., p. 113.Google Scholar
  20. 1.
    This is one of the much-debated topics in phenomenology. Cf. Sartre’s The Transcendence of the Ego, op. cit., directed against Husserl; Gurwitsch, “A Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness,” PPR, Vol. I (March, 1941), pp. 325–38; and Natanson, “The Empirical and Transcendental Ego,” in: For Roman Ingarden: Nine Essays in Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, pp. 42–53, esp. 48–50.Google Scholar

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© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1971

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  • Richard M. Zaner

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