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Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 17))

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Abstract

To understand Sartre’s theory of the body, it is necessary to place it in the context, first of his general ontology and second in that of his theory of intersubjectivity. In the first place, as is well-known, two of the three “ontological dimensions” of the body — the body-of-the-Other and my body-for-the-Other — make their appearance, ontologically, only subsequent to the encounter with the other.1 The appearance of the Other as “dans son corps,” indeed, is itself made possible only in and through my own “objectité,” my own being made an object by the Other’s “look.” Making an object of the Other presupposes having been made an object by him.2

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References

  1. L’Etre et le Néant, Librarie Galliard (Paris, 1943), p. 405. (Hereafter cited textually as EN.) Cf. also pp. 335–36.

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  2. The Transcendence of the Ego, Noonday Press (New York, 1957), cf. pp. 50–53.

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  3. M. Natanson, “Phenomenology and Existentialism: Husserl and Sartre on Intentionality,” The Modern Schoolman, Vol. xxxvii (November, 1959), pp. 1–10.

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  4. Ibid., p. 3. Natanson’s reference is to Sartre, “A Fundamental Idea of the Phenomenology of Husserl: Intentionality,” Situations, I, Gallimard (Paris, 1947), pp. 31–35.

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  5. Natanson, ibid. Merleau-Ponty, as well, attempts to existentialize Husserl’s phenomenology, in much the same manner.

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  6. Natanson, op. cit., pp. 6–7.

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  7. Ibid., pp. 8–9. “…Sartre’s determination to rescue Husserl from himself blinds him to the very subjectivity existentialism seeks.” (p. 9)

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  8. Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, op. cit., p. 45.

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  9. Ibid., pp. 53–54.

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  10. Sartre departs fundamentally from Husserl at this point as well: for Husseri the fundamental stratum of consciousness is affirmative; negation is founded on this. Cf. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch, M. Niemeyer (Halle a.d.S., 1913), § 106, pp. 218–219.

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  11. Loc. cit.

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  12. The Transcendence of the Ego, op. cit., p. 90.

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  13. Ibid., p. 91.

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© 1971 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands

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Zaner, R.M. (1971). Introduction. In: The Problem of Embodiment. Phaenomenologica, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3014-4_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-3014-4_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-3016-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-3014-4

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