Abstract
We begin with a question: What sort of an ethics, if any, is possible granted the validity of the Wittgensteinian principle of verifiability and the threefold classification of sentences as significant, tautologous, or meaningless?2 Three, and only three, alternative types of ethical theory seem possible given the above conditions3. These types I label (i) Emotivist, (ii) Positivistic Utilitarian, and (iii) Significant Tautologies.
It is stylish today to say that so-called moral judgments are not judgments in the true sense. Some say that they are volitional utterances. Some say that they are emotive utterances. The present essay will attempt to show that moral judgments are judgments in the correct sense of the term. It will also attempt to be precise about the volitional and emotive references of moral judgments.1
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References
Harold Newton Lee, “What Are So-called Moral Judgments About?,” Tulane Studies in Philosophy, VI (1957), 87. Hereafter cited in the text (in parentheses) as “WMJ,” followed by the page number.
Harold Newton Lee, “The Meaning of ‘Intrinsic Value’,” in R. Lepley, The Language of Value (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p. 178. Hereafter cited in the text (in parentheses) as “MIV,” followed by the page number.
Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1948), pp. 107–108. Hereafter cited in the text (in parentheses) as “L7\L,” followed by the page number.
Harold Newton Lee, “A Semantic Criticism of Reichenbach’s Ethics,” Ethics, LXIV (1953–54), 310.
Rudolf Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1935), p. 24. Hereafter cited in the text (in parentheses) as “PLS,” followed by the page number.
Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 11. Hereafter cited in the text (in parentheses) as “EL,” followed by the page number.
Moritz Schlick, Problems of Ethics (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939), p. 21. Hereafter cited in the text (in parentheses) as followed by the page number.
Norman Malcolm, “Defending Common Sense,” Philosophical Review, LVIII (1949), 201–220.
Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 5th ed. ( London: Macraillan, 1893 ), p. 428.
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© 1972 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
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Whittemore, R.C. (1972). Positivistic Paths to Value. In: Reck, A.J. (eds) Knowledge and Value. Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2824-0_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2824-0_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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