# Ontic Commitments of Quantum Mechanics

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## Abstract

In this paper, we are trying to do two things: to present a general theory about the interpretation of scientific theories, and to use quantum mechanics as a test case for judging the validity of this metatheory. By a metatheory of scientific theories, I mean a general theory concerning the structure, functioning, and interpretation of scientific theories. The construction of such metatheories has been one of the primary concerns of philosophers of science in the twentieth century. A brief historical sketch may serve to show some of the limitations in the results so far obtained. Here, a word of caution is in order. Since this historical sketch is simply intended as a background to make a new interpretation intelligible, we will present a schematic view which necessarily oversimplifies the positions considered.

## Keywords

Quantum Mechanic Linear Operator Classical Mechanic Scientific Theory Dynamical Variable## Preview

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## Reference

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