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The Repeating of The Clarification of the Concept of Phenomenon. Transcendence and Immanence

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Abstract

The assertion which tells us that Being must be able to show itself is ambiguous. This ambiguity grows to the point of leading our inquiry astray and of misinterpreting the meaning of the problematic which aims at the essence while the possibility for Being’s showing itself is put into relationship with the methodological task of phenomenology. The methodological task of phenomenology is understood as one of clarification. To clarify means to show, to bring to light that which is initially not beneath the rays of this light. That which must be clarified is that which is first hidden. Once it is put into relationship with the task of the clarification of phenomenology, the possibility for Being’s showing itself appears as a possibility which of itself is not effective, a possibility which, to be precise, finds its realization only in and through this task. It is only when phenomenology has accomplished its work that the essence which it clarifies comes to light, namely, that Being shows itself. The first result of the clarification of the concept of phenomenon, however, was to make evident the [166] necessity of effecting a dissociation between this work of clarification which, on the one hand, defines the task of phenomenology and, on the other hand, the reality of the concept which forms its object, namely, the bursting forth of the essence in the effectiveness of its phenomenal condition.

Keywords

Ontological Structure True Knowledge Ontological Reality Natural Knowledge Absolute Knowledge 
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© Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1973

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