Abstract
This paper is intended to sort out some problems in the philosophical foundations of biology. For the reader’s convenience, the questions referred to in the text are listed here:
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(1)
Is a one-level ontology adequate to account for the major areas of human experience, both in and out of science?
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(2)
If not, how can we formulate adequately a many-levelled ontology ?
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(3)
Is biology reducible to physics and chemistry?
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(4)
Is biology a molecular science ?
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(5)
Are all biological explanations mechanical or are some irreducibly teleological?
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(6)
Did life in its present form originate from non-life and by what means ?
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(7)
Is all biology molecular science? i. e., is every biological discipline in principle molecular?
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(8)
Is some biology molecular? Or is every biological discipline in principle non-molecular?
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(9)
Meta-question: Are questions seven and eight philosophical or empirical?
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(10)
Are physics and chemistry molecular sciences?
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(11)
Is the distinction between the living and the non-living primarily morphological or functional?
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References
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© 1974 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Grene, M. (1974). Biology and the Problem of Levels of Reality. In: The Understanding of Nature. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2224-8_3
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