Abstract
We shall now consider that style of statistical inference called subjectivistic or personalistic or (in a special sense) Bayesian. It is based on a conception of probability altogether different from that underlying the investigations of the previous chapters. It was suggested at one point in the last chapter that there might be difficulty in motivating an agent to follow the recommendations of a minimax policy if he had certain convictions concerning the relative likelihood of the various alternative hypotheses. The subjectivistic approach takes this likelihood, and not long-run frequency or propensity, to be the subject matter of probability. Adopting this technique has profound consequences for the theory of statistical inference.
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Notes
F. P. Ramsey, ‘Truth and Probability’, in The Foundations of Mathematics, London 1931, pp. 156–198.
A. Shimony, ‘Coherence and the Axioms of Confirmation’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1955), 1–28.
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See, for example, Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer, Introduction to Statistical Decision Theory, New York 1965.
The proof of this will be found in D. V. Lindley, Probability and Statistics, Vol. 2, Cambridge 1965, p. 3.
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Hintikka, op.cit.
Gerhard Tintner, ‘The Foundations of Probability and Statistical Inference’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A 112 (1949), 251–279.
Recall the discussion of probability dynamics toward the end of Section 7.
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© 1974 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Kyburg, H.E. (1974). Subjective and Logical Approaches. In: The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference. Synthese Library, vol 65. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2175-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2175-3_5
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