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Abstract

The Revolution of 1848 marked the emergence of Germany’s first political parties. This event originally seemed to establish a simple two-party arrangement with the emergence of a liberal opposition from the bourgeoisie to challenge the conservative ruling social groups. However, controversy in the late 1860’s over the mode of unification led to a splintering of the liberal opposition, with the National Liberals becoming the advocates of monarchism, militarism and a strong national policy and the Progressive Liberals emerging as the real carriers of the German liberal tradition. Under the Empire, the political horizons soon broadened with the emergence of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and a specifically Catholic party, the German Center Party (DZP). These five parties represented the leading political forces in pre-World War I Germany. They were joined by a large number of small ethnic, regional, anti-Semitic, nationalist, and radical parties. The multiplicity of parties during this period is illustrated by the fact that as early as 1896 the German parliament (Reichstag) contained fifteen parties, no one of them with as much as one quarter of the seats.

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© 1974 Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. Netherlands

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Fisher, S.L. (1974). The Evolution of the German Party System. In: The Minor Parties of the Federal Republic of Germany. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2079-4_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2079-4_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-247-1658-6

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