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Presuppositional Policies

  • Hans G. Herzberger
Chapter
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 43)

Abstract

For those of us who believe in the philosophical fruitfulness of the methods of formal semantics, any powerful expansion of those methods is a noteworthy event. When that expansion is not only powerful but also classical in spirit, it is doubly auspicious. Over the last few years, super- valuational methods have been applied to several difficult philosophical topics, and without exception these applications have proved illuminating.1 Above all, they have demonstrated the feasibility of studying those topics within formal semantics. A case in point is the logic of presuppositions, which was formerly believed to lie outside the domain of topics amenable to such a treatment. Here as elsewhere, supervaluational semantics provided new paradigms for philosophical work on the topic, while substantially raising the standards of investigation.

Keywords

Conservative Policy Adequacy Condition Radical Policy Accountability Condition Atomic Sentence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Bibliography

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 1976

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hans G. Herzberger
    • 1
  1. 1.University of TorontoUSA

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