On Representing ‘True-in-L’ in L
Given Tarski’s familiar treatment of the semantic paradoxes, no formal language can adequately represent its own truth-concept.1 But natural languages do, apparently, express their own truth-concepts and this fact alone has been enough to motivate some to seek alternative treatments of the paradoxes. In this paper we demonstrate that a language construed according to the ‘category’ approach,2 modified in certain respects, can indeed express its own truth-concept.
KeywordsConcrete Object Philosophical Review Individual Constant Complex Predicate Liar Paradox
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