Epistemic Interpretation of Conditionals
The presence of a connection between conditionals and conditional probabilities has been pointed out by several authors (the first, to my knowledge, was E. W. Adams in his (1965).) The epistemic interpretation of conditionals given here will not refer to conditional probability directly, but is based on the logic of conditional belief. Conditional beliefs, however, can be derived from conditional subjective probabilities.
KeywordsTruth Condition Subjective Probability Objective Probability Rational Concept Epistemic Logic
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