Epistemic Interpretation of Conditionals

  • Franz Von Kutschera
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 43)


The presence of a connection between conditionals and conditional probabilities has been pointed out by several authors (the first, to my knowledge, was E. W. Adams in his (1965).) The epistemic interpretation of conditionals given here will not refer to conditional probability directly, but is based on the logic of conditional belief. Conditional beliefs, however, can be derived from conditional subjective probabilities.


Truth Condition Subjective Probability Objective Probability Rational Concept Epistemic Logic 
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  2. Koopman, B. O., 1940, ‘The Axioms and Algebra of Intuitive Probability’, Annals of Mathematics 41, 269–292.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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  4. Kutschera, F. v., forthcoming, Einführung in die intensionale Semantik, W. de Gruyter, Berlin.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 1976

Authors and Affiliations

  • Franz Von Kutschera
    • 1
  1. 1.Universität RegensburgGermany

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