Abstract
In the last paragraphs of the previous chapter, we explained why we believe that Popper’s criticism of the radical empiricist solution of the problem of relation between facts and theories is correct. The Popperian point of view in this matter is, as we have noticed, a variant of conventionalism. Despite a number of interesting details in Popper’s proposals, his solution of this problem is not at all surprising: the criticism of the concept of ‘bare empirical facts’ is to be found within all conventionalist doctrines, in the writings of Poincaré1 and Duhem,2 as well as in the works of Adjukiewicz stemming from the period when he still held this position. We must remember, however, that Adjukiewicz did not abandon this criticism even when he gave up the position of conventionalism. As I do not believe either that the alternative to radical empiricism of some kind of conventionalism exhausts all the possibilities for solving the problem, I will now discuss it in more detail. With this intent I will first present Popper’s conventionalist solution of the problem of the relation between facts and theories and then, in the concluding paragraphs of this chapter, discuss in general terms the controversy between empiricism and conventionalism.
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Notes
“It is often said that experiments should be made without preconceived ideas. That is impossible. Not only would it make every experiment fruitless, but even if we wished to do so, it could not be done. Every man has his own conception of the world, and this he cannot so easily lay aside. We must, for example, use language. And our language is necessarily steeped in preconceived ideas. Only they are unconscious, preconceived ideas which are a thousand times the most dangerous of all.” (H. Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis, New York 1952, p. 143.)
P. Duhem, Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, New York 1962.
K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, London 1969.
K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 101–102.
Ibid., p. 86.
R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Chicago 1951
H. Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction, Chicago 1938
H. Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, Berkeley 1951.
Cf. also S. Amsterdamski, ‘O obiektywnych interpretacjach pojęcia prawdopodobieńtstwa’ (On the Objective Interpretations of the Concept of Probability) in Prawo, konieczność, prawdopodobieństwo, Warsaw 1964, pp. 1–125.
The possibility of the probabilistic estimation of scientific hypotheses is a matter for discussion. First of all, it may be doubted whether the Carnapian theory provides the possibility of a quantitative estimate of the degree of confirmation when the evidence, in respect to which we estimate the probability of a hypotheses, is not statistical. (S. Amsterdamski, op. cit. Part I). Secondly, even if this estimation is possible, it is irrelevant in respect to the truth of the estimated hypothesis. A false hypothesis which follows deductively from false premises has the probability p=l.
(Cf. S. Amsterdamski, ibid.
S. Amsterdamski, ‘Prawdziwość i prawiopodobieństwo’ (Truth and Probability), Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego, 1967, pp. 1–15). Finally, it is doubtful whether the Popperian conception gives the possibility of a quantitative estimation of a hypothesis, since we can never point to all its potential falsifiers. Accepting the Popperian theory of probabilistic estimation, we would be compelled to state that the general theory of relativity hardly satisfied his methodological requirements, as we can point out few potential falsifiers, while the general field theory does not satisfy them at all. I am not convinced whether his and the Carnapian theories of the probabilistic estimation of scientific hypotheses are as opposed as Popper believes. It seems rather that both of them attempt to apply the calculus of probability for different aims, and are based on different interpretations of the calculus. The practical applicability of both conceptions in scientific research seems very limited.
The detailed analysis of these conventions may be found in I. Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (ed. by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave), Cambridge 1970, pp. 91–195.
I. Lakatos, ibid.
T. S. Kuhn, ‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research’, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge pp. 1–27.
N. Bohr: ‘Discussions with A. Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics’, in Albert Einstein — Philosopher Scientist (ed. by P. Schilpp), Evanston 1959, pp. 199–243.
K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, pp. 215–248.
Ibid., pp. 242–248.
Ibid., pp. 231–234.
J. Agassi, ‘Science in Flux,’ Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky), Vol. III, Dordrecht 1967, pp. 293–324.
Ibid., p. 311.
K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 248, footnote 31.
J. Agassi, ibid., p. 314.
In a footnote to the chapter ‘Unity of Method’ in Poverty of Historicism, Popper wrote (p. 131): “See my Logic of Scientific Discovery on which the present section is based, especially the doctrine of test by way of deduction (‘deductivism’) and of the redundancy of any further ‘induction’, since theories always retain their hypothetical character (‘hypotheticism’), and the doctrine that scientific tests are genuine attempts to falsify theories (‘eliminationism’)…”.
I. Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’ in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, p. 106.
I. Lakatos, ibid., p. 115.
K. Ajdukiewicz, ‘Das Weltbild und die Begriffsapparatur’, Erkenntnis 4 (1934) 262.
K. Ajdukiewicz, ‘W sprawie artykułu profesora A. Schaffa o moich poglądach filozoficznych’ (Reply to Professor A. Schaff’s Paper on my Philosophical Opinions), in K. Ajdukiewicz, Język i Poznanie (Language and Cognition), Vol. I, Warsaw 1965, p. 177.
A. Grünbaum, ‘Geometry, Chronometry and Empiricism’, in: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III, 1062, pp. 405–527 (cf. especially pp. 419–424).
H. Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis, New York, 1952: “…no experiment will ever be in contradiction with Euclid’s postulate; but on the other hand, no experiment will ever be in contradiction with Lobatschewsky’s postulate” (p. 75) and “To sum up, whatever way we look at it, it is impossible to discover in geometric empiricism a rational meaning.” (p. 79) And further: “…this law [of inertia]…can be extended fearlessly to the most general cases; for we know that in these general cases it can neither be confirmed nor contradicted by experiment.” (p. 97)
W. V. Quine, ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’, in Logic and Language — Studies Deducated to Professor Rudolf Carnap, Dordrecht 1962, p. 63.
H. Poincaré, The Value of Science, New York 1958.
K. Ajdukiewicz, ‘Das Weltbild und die Begriffsapparatur’, p. 263.
K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 16.
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Amsterdamski, S. (1975). Facts and Theories: Conventionalism. In: Between Experience and Metaphysics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1797-8_5
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