Abstract
Any theoretical reflection on science must, implicitly or explicitly, base itself on a more or less articulated definition of science. Thus, for instance, it is impossible to study the history of science without accepting in advance some opinion concerning the scope of the phenomenon, the evolution of which one attempts to investigate. When a historian of science begins his investigation with Antiquity or with the Renaissance, when he includes within, or excludes from, the universe under study such domains of knowledge as magic, astrology, alchemy, mathematics or philosophy, he expresses, by the same token, his opinion of the question: ‘what is science’, even if he does not mention this problem explicitly. The same is true, of course, in the case of the psychology or the sociology of science.
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References
K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London 1956, p. 34.
Cf. R. Caraap: ‘Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache’, Erkenntnis 2 (1932). [English translation in Logical Positivism, ed. Ayer, Glencoe, Illinois, 1959, pp. 60–81. — Ed.]
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Cf. E. Cassirer, Substance and Function, New York 1953, Part I.
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Cf. my ‘Nauka i wartości’, ‘Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa 1 (1971), and ‘Scjentyzm i rewolucja naukowo-techniczna’, Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa, 3 (1970).
Cf. K. Pomian: ‘Działanie i sumienie’, Studia Filozoficzne 3 (1967); S. Amsterdamski, ‘Nauka wspołczesna i wartości, ‘Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa 1 (1971).
L. Kołakowski, op. cit., p. 202.
Cf. W. W. Bartley, ‘Theories of Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics’, in Problems in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3, Amsterdam 1968, pp. 40–64, and the discussion on this paper, pp. 64–119.
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© 1975 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Amsterdamski, S. (1975). Troubles with the Problem of Demarcation. In: Between Experience and Metaphysics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1797-8_2
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