Abstract
In the preceding chapters we have discussed Ducasse’s most important contributions to metaphysics and epistemology. However, there are a number of other metaphysical and epistemological topics to which Ducasse gave considerable attention. The most significant of these additional topics — propositions, truth and signs — we shall consider briefly in this chapter.1
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Notes
Our exposition of Ducasse’s views on propositions and truth is based on articles he published over a twenty-year period: “A Liberalistic View of Truth,” Philosophical Review 34 (1925), 580-98; “Verification, Verifiability, and Meaningfulness,” Journal of Philosophy 33 (1936), 230-36; “Propositions, Opinions, Sentences, and Facts,” Journal of Philosophy 37 (1940), 701-11; “Truth, Verifiability, and Propositions about the Future,” Philosophy of Science 8 (1941) 329-37; “Is a Fact a True Proposition? — A Reply,” JP 39 (1942), 132-36; “Propositions, Truth, and the Ultimate Criterion of Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (1943-44), 317-40; “Facts, Truth, and Knowledge,” P&PR 5 (1944-45), 320-32; “Some Comments on Professor Nagel’s Latest Remarks,” ibid., 338-40; and “Some Comments on Professor Sellars’ ‘Knowing and Knowledge’,” ibid., 345-47. Almost none of the material in these articles was included in Nature, Mind, and Death, but the three most important articles were reprinted in Truth, Knowledge and Causation, and the latter volume will be cited when references are made to the reprinted articles. Our discussion of Ducasse’s views on signs is based on: Chapter 16 of Nature, Mind and Death; “Symbols, Signs and Signals,” Journal of Symbolic Logic 4 (1939), 41-52; “Some Comments on C.W. Morris’s ‘Foundations of the Theory of Signs’,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 (1942), 43-52; “Some Comments on Professor Wild’s Criticisms of My Views on Semiosis,” P. & P.R. 8 (1947), 234-38; and “Some Comments on Professor Wild’s Preceding Remarks,” P.& P.R. 8 (1947), 242-44. “Symbols, Signs, and Signals” is reprinted in Truth, Knowledge and Causation, pp. 73–89.
Questions have been raised about Ducasse’s exclusion of negatives from propositions. For a discussion of this issue see: Ronald E. Santoni, “Problems Regarding C.J. Ducasse’s Analysis of a Proposition,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (1969), 257—60; Peter H. Hare, “Propositions and Adverbial Metaphysics,” ibid., 267f; and Santoni, “Ducasse, Hare, and ‘Non-Assertorial Negatives’,” SJP 9 (1971), 95-97.
Letter to A.P. Ushenko, February 16, 1942. This letter is part of a lengthy correspondence between Ducasse and Ushenko concerning the nature of propositions.
Journal of Symbolic Logic 7 (1942), 95.
It is interesting that Roderick Chisholm once suggested to Ducasse that he adopt an adverbial theory of propositions. After several times in earlier letters (June 25, 1944; May 24, 1945; and June 25, 1945) expressing doubt that we need to suppose that there are propositions, Chisholm wrote Ducasse (November 29, 1951) that “[o]ne of your views, I believe might be formulated by saying that propositions are alien accusatives of believings. I think one could plausibly argue, applying Occam’s razor, that propositions are merely connate accusatives of believings. Possibly you would regard this as an abuse of the technique [the technique of reducing allegedly alien accusatives to connate accusatives] — though I am inclined to feel that it may be applied to propositions quite as legitimately as to sense data…” Ducasse’s reply to Chisholm (November 30, 1951) is interesting though somewhat inconclusive: “Your suggestion that propositions may be merely connate accusatives of believing is interesting, and, offhand, I do not see any particular reason why this could not be the case. The test would be whether any propositions ‘exist’ or’ subsist’ which are not being believed, disbelieved, or doubted. Also is there such a thing as belief, disbelief, or doubt having no proposition as ‘content’ or ‘object’. The instances of ‘folie du doute’, and of ‘conviction’ as a bare feeling or emotion (as in the mystic trance or the ‘anaesthetic revelation’? ) might be cases in point. As to existence or subsistence of propositions independently of their being believed, disbelieved or doubted, the first thing needed, of course, would be agreement as to what exactly a proposition is. If, as Baylis believes, a proposition is a particular kind of concept, then the answer would seem to be that they have no independent existence. If, on the other hand, in ‘this table weighs 300 lbs.’ the table which the words ‘this table’ denotes is, as I think, a literal constituent of the proposition that sentence formulates, then it would seem that at least some constituents of some propositions exist independently of their being believed, disbelieved, or doubted. As you say, it turns out to be a long story.”
Truth, Knowledge and Causation, p. 146.
“Verification, Verifiability, and Meaningfulness,” p. 231.
Truth, Knowledge and Causation, p. 171; cf. p. 191.
Ibid., p. 172f.
Ibid., p. 173.
Ibid., p.177.
Ernest Nagel, “Truth and Knowledge of the Truth,” P&PR 5 (1944–45), 53; and Charles A. Baylis, “Critical Comments on the’ symposium on Meaning and Truth’,” ibid., p. 92.
“Facts, Truth, and Knowledge,” p. 326f.
Truth, Knowledge and Causation, p. 178.
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© 1975 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Hare, P.H., Madden, E.H. (1975). Propositions, Truth and Signs. In: Causing, Perceiving And Believing. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1786-2_6
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