Abstract
Andronicus of Rhodes (70 B.C.) gives to the sixth book of his collection of Aristotle’s works the title The Post-Physical’ (ta meta ta fysik?), since it follows the book of physics (fysike akroasi?). It is only since the late Middle Ages that all o? philosophy or one of its disciplines is designated by Andronicus’ term. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) himself speaks of ‘wisdom’ (sofi?), ‘first philosophy’ (prote filosofik?) or ‘theology’ (theologik?). 1 For him, this science deals with being qu? being. He calls it ‘first philosophy’ because it investigates the eternal and firs? causes and principles of being,2 and he sometimes refers to it by the title ‘theology’ because he considers God as one of the first causes.3
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Notes
Cf. the analysis by Zimmermann.
Me. I Ac 1982 a 1-3.
Me. I A c 1 983 a 8-9.
Me. VIE c l 1026 a 13-16.
Cf. Heidegger 17; Owens 229; Moser 11; Zimmermann 101-108.
Metap., Proem; Moser 13ff.
De Tri. 5, 1, c: “… quia scientia de necessariis est … Omne quod necessarium inquantum huiusmodi est immobile.”
Eisler 128; Martin 203.
Wolff, G, Philosophia Rationali Frankfurt-Leipzig 1728, III, §99.
Descartes, R., Principia philosophia Amsterdam 1657, p. 7
Lo. I 35. Cf. Phä 35f. Cf. Martin 205.
K.r.. A 337, note.
Metaphysi 19. Cf. Eisler 129f.
Anfangsgründ 17.
Berl. Sch. 743ff.
Be. 91: “… for I identify logic with metaphysics…”
Be. 85f.
Lo. I 46f.
Lo. I 32f.
Lo. I 10, 16, 18f.
Interpreters have evaluated this identification in diverse ways. N. Hartmann regards it as compromising dialectic; Kroner (II 302f.), by contrast, as a revolution in the history of philosophy: “Hegel breaks with the view, sanctioned and fixed by a tradition of two thousand years, which alleges that logic is a science which can be taken out of the organism of philosophy… and be treated separately. With his innovation, he returns to Plato, for whom dialectic was a member of the whole of science.”
N.Hartmann III 17.
Lo. I 16.
Lo. I 31; Lo. II 356.
Lo. I 46. It should be noted that the content of imaginative representations (Vorstellungen) — including religious ones like ‘God’ — are thing-like and therefore subject to the same criticism as the world of things.
Be. 2; Re. I-I 7f. The relevance of formal logic for the study of religions has only recently be pointed out (Bochenski VI).
Bruaire29;J. Hoffmeister (Hegels Werk, Vol. XIX, Leipzig 1932,p. 115);G. Lasson (in Re. II-II, p. viii); Garaudy I 428; Kojève 538f.; Kruithof 76; Grégoire III 210. — Grégoire’s position is shared by Ballestrem. We cannot deal with this question in detail since we would have to take up too many questions which lie outside the realm of metaphysics of being (e.g., that of the relationship of faith and knowledge).
On the modern conception of formal logic, cf. Bocheński III, passi, esp. p. 326ff.
Cf. En. §§24, 42, 119 note, 162.
Cf. Part I, Chapter 3, notes 44ff.
Lo. I 33.
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© 1975 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Sarlemijn, A. (1975). ‘Metaphysics’ — a Philosophical Discipline. In: Hegel’s Dialectic. Sovietica, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1736-7_5
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