Abstract
The problem of the relationship of dialectic and its subject matter includes three questions: (1) How is the dialectical method related to the starting-point of philosophy? (2) To what extent is the movement in human reason an adequate rendition of the developing whole? (3) What is the difference between the goal of the dialectical method, i.e. the system, and the objectively existing absolute? Does Hegel regard his system as the adequate and final representation of the absolute?
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Notes
Lo. I 11; Phä. 28.
Phä. 25.
N. Hartmann I 310-15, 321, 371ff., 384 ff.; Nink 104.
Gesc. 1142.
Lo. II 486. — ‘Law of thought’ is here not taken in the sense of ‘rule of formal logic’, but in that of ‘epistemological law’; for the justification, see Sections 3.2235 and 3.2236.
Vera 69ff.; Stommel 16, 22; Brunswig 84; Ogiermann 42;Garaudy II 32ff.
Phalén 169, 123, 166; Coreth 42, 54.
Guzzoni 101.
Sesemann, (aa) = 32, (bb) = 41, (cc) = 59.
N. Hartmann, (aa) = I 394, 398 and II 17, (bb) = I 398, (cc) = 401.
Grégoire III 96; Coreth 37f.
Schmitt 13. — Lakebrink, too (130f. and 150ff.), emphasizes the difference between the analytical and the dialectical points of view.
Aebi 5; Trendelenburg II 14f.; Überweg 204; Borelius 28.
Berman 89; E. von Hartmann, (aa) = 38, (bb) = 39, (cc) = 44, (dd) = 41, (ee) = 46, (ff) = 52.
Nink 105; Devizzi 472; Pelloux 103; Fischer I 498; Kroner II 326; Maggiore 30; Sfard 30.
Albrecht 52; Lasson, Introduction to the Logic (Hegels sämtliche Werk, Vol. 3, Leipzig 1932, p. lxii);Stace 94.
Mure II 139ff.
Bullinger 17, 25; Michelet 14, 31f.; Rosenkranz I 300ff.; Il’in: Iljin 133-141; Chiereghin II 61,63. The positions of Cunningham (40ff.)and Clay (12ff.) remain obscure; they probably have to be counted among this group.
Chiereghin III 61: “…mai essere data né detta …”
Ibid.: “La riduzione del contraddittorio a contrario.”
McTaggart 8; Glockner 133, 124; Maier 80f.; Grégoire, (aa) = I 47 and II 57, (bb) = III 68, (cc) = II 69-63, (dd) = I 50, II 58 and III 70, (ee) = II 56, (ff) = HI 117 and II 56. — A discussion similar to the one presented here can be found in Soviet literature. However, this discussion is not to be regarded as an interpretation of Hegel, for what is at issue is the dialectical-materialist contradiction; on this point, cf. Lobkowicz. — On the relationship of Soviet metaphysics of knowledge to Hegel, cf. Ballestrem.
McTaggart 8: “Imperfection and contradiction are really, according to Hegel, due only to our manner of contemplating the object.”
Grégoire III 117: Ce quiest logiquement contradictoire, n’est pas.” II 56: “Toute chose a l’état ‘abstrait’, c’est-à-dire à l’état d’isolement, serait logiquement contradictoir, im possible. “
Cf. First Interpretation (C).
Lo. II 60. Cf. Phä. 100.
Borelius 29f.
Aebi 2.
Lo. II 61.
Jen. Lo. 132-143; Lo. II 23-62, esp. 58 — Cf. Chapter 2 of this Part.
En. §115, note; Lo. II 58.
Lo. II 61.
Lo. II 59.
Lo. II 409.
Lo. II 58.
Lo. I 94.
Cf. First Interpretation (B).
Lo. I 95.
Lo. I 143.
Lo. I 31.
En. §214, note.
En. §193, note; cf. also Re. II-II 85f., where the double form of the logical idea is explicitly dealt with.
E.Weil 262f.
Phä. 39,29
Jen. Lo. 136.
En. §24, note; Lo. I 32. This separating activity in the subject-side and the object-side of absolute reason has been discussed in detail in Section 2.23, and we saw in Section 32221 how Hegel attributes it to a universal reason.
Re II-II 58.
To justify our use of the quoted text, it should be noted that, although it is taken from the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religio, it is not taken from the students’ notes, but rather from Hegel’s manuscripts themselves. Besides, the assertions in question were already implicitly present in the text of the Encyclopedi which was quoted in Section 3.2221.
Lo. II 490f.
En. §26.
En. §16, note and §62, note; Borelius 27.
E. von Hartmann 42.
Gesc. HI 365f.
Cf.En. §24,note, §§116ff., §§181ff.
Gesc. III 368.
Gesc. III 367: “But here again we come across the drawback in the whole Aristotelian manner — as also in all subsequent logic — and indeed in its highest degree: that in thought and in the movement of thought as such, the individual moments fall asunder; there is a host of kinds of judgments and conclusions, each of which is deemed to hold independently (fir sic), and is supposed to have truth in and for itself, as such. … in this isolation they have, however, no truth; it rather is their totality alone which is the truth of thought, because this totality is at once subjective and objective.” — Cf. also Lo. I 46.
Bocheński-Menne 38; cf. also Bocheński V 13.
Phalén 171.
Phä. 34.
N. Hartmann I 255; Kroner II 217.
Cf. N.Hartmann 321.
En. §214, note: “… not separate in time, nor indeed in any other way …” Lo. II 411: “The idea is, therefore, in spite of this objectivity utterly simpl and immateria, for the externality exists only as determined by the concept and as taken up into its negative unity; insofar as it exists as indifferent externality it is not merely at the mercy of mechanism in general,but exists only as the transitory and the untrue.”
Gesc. I 140: “We thus have to distinguish the natural concrete from the concrete of thought.”
According to Lenin (32If.), for instance, the assumption of an absolute is at variance with a theory of development.
Several times, Hegel compares the unfolding of the idea to the career of a man (e.g., Gesc. I 104, 140f.; Phä. 22) or the development of a plant (Gesc. I 102).
Cf. Gesc. I 108, 123, 148, 242, 247.
Gesc. I 117ff.
Gesc. I 36: Nature i as it is and its changes are thus only repetition, its movement is merely cyclical.
Re MI 49.
Gesc. I 124: “History of philosophy considers only on philosophy, only on action, which is, however, subdivided into various stages.” Gesc. 1126: “The various philosophies have not only contradicted, but refuted, one another.”
Kroner II 381: “Insofar as it is alive, topical and timely, each philosophy has the double peculiarity of being dependent on the time and still timeless, absolute. … In the preface to philosophy, Hegel draws attention to the connection of his philosophy and the point in time in which it is appearing.” (The reference is to Phä. 10.)
The most fundamental principle of the Hegelian interpretation of history is: “The beginning stages of the spirit are poorer, the later are richer” (Gesc. I 141).
En. §564, note: “The old conception of Nemesis… was confronted by Plat and Aristotl with the doctrine that God is not enviou.”
Lo. 505f.
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Sarlemijn, A. (1975). The Subject Matter of Dialectical Philosophy. In: Hegel’s Dialectic. Sovietica, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1736-7_4
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