Abstract
An analysis of texts in which Hegel describes his method (Section 2.1), and an examination of the methodological principles which he borrows from German philosophy (Section 2.2) will enable us to comprehend the nature of his dialectic (Section 2.3). Our discussion of negative dialectic will be supplemented in this context: negative dialectic does not only figure as a presupposition — as in the preceding chapter, but also as a moment of the dialectical movement.
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Notes
Sichirollo 18-34.
Metap. A, 6, 987 b 32; M, 4, 1078 b 25. — Diels 128 (unes 25f.).
Hegel calls both Zeno (Gesc. II 284) and Plato (Lo. II 491) ‘originator’ of the dialectic.
Diels 121 (line 12).
Diels 120 (lines 1-34).
It is commonly believed that the reference is to the Pythagoreans; cf. Raedemaeker 175.
Diels 114.
Diels 133ff.
While E. von Hartmann (2) and Raedemaeker (121) consider this report as unreliable — according to them, the principle had not yet been sufficiently worked out at the time — they contradict themselves when they claim at the same time that the contemporaries of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Zeno based their theories on the same principle (E. von Hartmann, 1; Raedemaeker 155). It should also be noted that Parmenides’ accusation about the “fools which holdt that being and not-being are the same” is directed at Heraclitus (Diels 117, line 18). Plato’s statements (Sop. 242 D) are similar to those of Aristotle.
Diels 70 (Une 19).
This expression is stressed by Hegel (Gesc. II 312); Heraclitus also speaks of the ‘logos’ (Diels 161, lines 30f.).
Raedemaeker 124 f., 146f.
Diels 314 (Une 24).
Diels 320 (line 26), 312 (line 24).
Raedemaeker 239.
Cf. Reinhardt 242.
The book by Schmitz-Moormann is devoted to this topic. — Concerning the Platonic dialectic in general, cf. Marten, and Gundert.
Republi 511 B
Republi 532A.
Republi 525 A. — E. Chambry (Platon, Oeuvres Comp, vol. 7, p.l) renders “Alla mentoi, efè, touto g’echei ouch hekista hè peri auto opsis …” by “Cette propriété, la vue de l’unité’ l’a certes au plus haut point….” Similarly, W. Wiegand (Platon, Werk II, Berlin).
Parmenide 127 E.
E. von Hartmann 4ff.; Sichirollo 81, note.
Hoffmann 64; Prauss 93-98, esp. 94f.; Gundert 297, 332, 389, 400ff., 407.
Parmenide 135 C., D.
Cf. Bocheński III 53, 59; E. von Hartmann 8ff.
K.r.. A 63f.
K.r.. B (p. xxx): “Therefore I had to abolish knowledg to make room for belie, …”. — Cf. K.r.. A 824-831. — K. Dürr has, in his article, referred to the Socratic-Aristotelian sense in which Kant uses the term ‘dialectic’. — Concerning the ambiguity of the Kantian term ‘dialectic’, cf, Heintel.
Lo. II 493.
Gesc. II 473.
En. §60, note.
The Skeptic sees merely nothingness, and does not discover in it the positive déterminateness of its being the result of a dissolution (Phä. 68).
Gesc. III 24f.
Gesc. II 260.
Gesc. II 286.
Gesc. II 299.
Gesc. III 198.
Gesc. III 207.
Timaeu 47 B, C.
Lo. I 35ff.
Lo. II 489. In this context (Lo. II 491) Hegel expressly notes the Platonism in his methodology.
Lo.II 495f.
Lo. II 497ff.
Lo. K 66f., 93.
N.Hartmann II 12.
Trendelenburg III 23 f.; Erdei 12, 142.
Nink 100f.
En. §20, note.
Lo. I 68.
Gesc. II 301.
Lo. I 69.
Lo. I 31.
Phä. 31
Cf. Section 2.12 (B), (b).
Lo. II 58-63; En. §120ff.
Lo. II 159f.
Cf. Schmitz-Moormann.
Lo. I 145.
The importance of these philosophers for an understanding of Hegel’s philosophy has been stressed by Kroner and N. Hartmann (I).
Lo. I 32; Lo. II 10; Phä. 181.
Lo. I 24ff; Lo. I 29ff.; Lo. II 231ff.
Lo. I 29.
Lo. I 25. This objection of Hegel holds for any epistemology which assumes that objective reality exists outside the subject, and that this reality amounts to more than a mere combination of formal determinations. At the end of his book, Maier points out the inadequacy of Hegel’s criticism of Kant: What Kant has in mind is not at all an epistemological immanence.
Lo II 408f.
Re II-I 20.
En. §60, note.
K.r.. A 583-631.
K.r.. A 426-461.
K.r. V. 345f.
On the Kantian as if: K.r. V. 672ff., A 861, A 685f., A 700. On error and illusion: K.r. V. 295ff. On transcendental illusion: K.r. V. 298ff., A 517ff.
On the positive meaning which the thing-in-itself received in Kant’s dialectic, cf. Kroner, Vol. 1, p. 125: “While the cause of sensation is a concept borrowed from the treatment of being in the metaphysics of the understanding where the problematic object has no more than a negative, limiting and limit-preserving significance, it is in the idea where the positive aspect which the thing-in-itself acquires in Kant’s philosophy is first revealed. Yet it is only in Kant’s successors, starting with Maimon, that this aspect has been exposed in its full significance: The thing-in-itself becomes a task, inasmuch as the understanding encounters in the matter of intuition an infinity of possible determinations, an infinite determinabilit. This infinite determinability which permits the understanding to enlarge its sphere step by step, and to expand it into the realm of what is given (wherein, basically, lies the essence of experience)… introduces into the concept of experience the practical elemen t.” — Since Kant, thinking is identical with creating one’s object.
K.r.V. 477
K.r.. A 833.
Lo. I 38.
Glu.. 1; cf. also Gl.u. W. and 14.
Lo. II 220ff., 225, 493ff.;Phä., Preface, passi, esp. 23; En. § §28ff., 33.
Gesc. I 30ff., 96ff., 113ff., 145ff., 300.
Lo. II 485: All content has its truth only by virtue of the method.
On Fichte’s dialectic, cf. Kroner and Radermacher..
Like Kant before him, J. G. Fichte (61) ascribes to contradiction a positive significance, if only on the subjective level: “Provided that this alien proposition also is systematically founded in consciousness in the way described above, the system to which the proposition belongs — because of the merely formal contradiction in its determinate being — would also have to contradict the entire first system materially (materialite), and must be based on a principle exactly opposite to the first principle; so that if the first principle were, e.g., I am I, the second would have to be: I am not I. From, this contradiction one ought not, and cannot, flatly infer the impossibility of such a second principle.” — The idea of circular movement can also be found in Fichte (61, 92).
Differen 76f.
Differen 79: “As the synthesis, the transition becomes an antinomy: but reflection, which means separating absolutely, cannot permit a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, of the determinate and the indeterminate, and it is reflection which legislates here. It has the right to assert a solely formal unity, because the dichotomy into infinite and finite, which is its work, has been granted and adopted; reason, however, synthesizes them in the antinomy, thus nullifying them. While an opposition of an ideal nature (ideelle Entgegensetzun) is the work of reflection which totally abstracts from the absolute identity, a real opposition is the work of reason which identifies the opposites not only in the form of knowledge, but also in the form of being, i.e., it also identifies identity with non-identity. And it is real opposition alone in which both subject and object are posited as subject-object, both existing in the absolute, in both the absolute, hence reality in both.” — Cf. also Lo. II 61.
Phä. 31; Lo. 17.
Lo. II 58, 469.
Phä. 23; Lo II 61; Gl.u.. 123.
Lo. I 35.
Lo. II 9ff. — Cf. Garaudy I 333.
Lo. II 202, 15.
Lo. II 58f.
Lo. I 92. Originating and perishing, as moments of becomin, have been left out of consideration above in order to facilitate the first encounter with the cycle theory. However, consideration of bot these moments is requisite for comprehending the essence of the dialectical movement.
Lo. II 33; cf. Section 3.221. 92 Lo. II 35.
Lo II 40. Hegel often writes the article ‘Ein’ with a capital (“… in Einer Identität verschiedene …”) in order to emphasize that we are dealing with one subsisting unity.
Lo. II 48f.
Lo I 35f.
Lo. II 60; cf. also Lo. II 72.
Cf. Chapter 1 of this Part.
Phä. 20f.
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Sarlemijn, A. (1975). Positive Dialectic. In: Hegel’s Dialectic. Sovietica, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1736-7_3
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