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Being is Thought

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Hegel’s Dialectic

Part of the book series: Sovietica ((SOVA,volume 33))

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Abstract

The circles of the metaphysics of being have been closed; the doctrine of being has become the theory of thought. Before determining the relationships between inorganic and organic nature and thought, Hegel examines, in the first section of the Doctrine of the Concep?, the presuppositions of freedom and of the identity between nature and thought. With this identity, he wishes to express that all of nature possesses an ideal mode of being or —which means the same — that it exists as objective being in general, as a moment in the thought of the all-embracing subject.

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Notes

  1. Lo. II 270, 311, 317ff., 338.

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  2. Lo. II 222.

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  3. Lo. II 225.

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  4. Re. I-I 219;EN. §76, note.

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  5. Lo. II 355.

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  6. Re. I-I 221.

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  7. Lo. II 354.

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  8. Lo. I 75.

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  9. Re. I-II 43; Lo. II 354f.

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  10. Re. II-II 42f.

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  11. Lo. II 230,236.

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  12. Lo. II 61.

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  13. Be. 175f;Re I-I 220f.

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  14. Log. II 385. The example of the cat-mouse relationship can be found again in Engels.

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  15. Be. 165.

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  16. Re. I-I 216f.

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  17. En. §216.

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  18. En. §187; Lo. II 429.

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  19. Cf. Lo. II 437ff.;Phä. 138f.

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  20. Phä. 189f.: “… what ough to be, in fact, i too; and what merely ough to be and i not, has not truth.”

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  21. Re. I-I 218.

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  22. To some interpreters, this theory has become an impediment. N. Hartmann (I 369), for instance: “… [the absolute] has its self-consciousness merely in us.” Garaudy (I 427), on the other hand: “It would be incorrect to infer from his precluding any transcendence of God that Hegel reduces God to man…”

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  23. Re II-II 85f.

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  24. Gesc. I 111.

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Authors
  1. Andries Sarlemijn
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© 1975 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Sarlemijn, A. (1975). Being is Thought. In: Hegel’s Dialectic. Sovietica, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1736-7_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1736-7_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-010-1738-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1736-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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