Abstract
This book is concerned with the essential features of Hegel’s dialectical method. It may be considered an introduction to the system of thought developed by the older Hegel, for this method pervades his entire system and coincides with th? form which is attributed to absolute spirit: For Hegel, everything which is (alles Seiend?) exists as a moment in a cycle pulsating with the force of contradiction.
In introductions, “that which in former ages occupied the mature minds of men [is supposed to have] sunk to the level of information, exercises, and even games, of boyhood”.
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spiri?
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Notes
En. §15. Cf. ibi § 17; Lo. I 56; Lo. II 500, 503f.
Jen. Lo. 140ff., 154f., 161ff., 168, 171, 175, 178, 181, 185; Realphi. 19, 29.
Cf. E. von Hartmann 119.
Marx 19.
Sartre 101: “SM’on se refuse a voirie mouvement dialectique originel dans l’individu et dans son entreprise de produire sa vie, de s’objectiver, il faudra renoncer à la dialectique ou en faire la loi immanents de l’Histoire.”
Lossky 70ff.
Feuerbach I 222f.: “Yet the secret of speculative philosoph [is] theology, speculative theolog which differs from ordinary theology in that it transfers the divine being which the latter, for fear and folly, removed into yonder world, into this world, i.e., it renders the divine being present, determinate, rea.” Cf. also Feuerbach II 426.
Lenin 321f.
Lenin 90, 172f., 197.
Lenin 182f., 250, 275.
Cf. Wetter I; and II 70, 116, 118,130.
Cf. Bocheński I, and II 86-99, also IV 19-26.
Gfropp’s (151) accusation is directed against E. P. Sitkovskij in particular.
Efirov 26ff. — Equally characteristic of the Hegel interpretation in East-European philosophy are the publications by Gulian and Ovsjannikov. Gulian writes (II 725): “As has been noted, we discovered in the various parts of Hegel’s works a fickle relationship between these two aspects, a contradiction between method and system.” Ovsjannikov notes (284): “Hegel’s philosophy, as is clear from the entire preceding exposition, suffers from an internal contradiction. It includes in one unity opposing and, as it were, mutually exclusive aspects a revolutionary method and a conservative system.”
Cf. A. Hartmann.
Weisse II 36ff.; cf. also I 143ff.
I. H. Fichte I 308: “Not contradictio, but opposition that is infinitely overcome, the seeking and finding which complemen each other, lov, is the inner pulse of the world.” — I. H. Fichte II 29: Hegel’s view of the contradiction as determinately being “is his error, from which all the other errors can just as consistently be deduced in detail”.
Trendelenburg III 7; Haring 100.
Trendelenburg III 12ff.; cf. also 1125.
Überweg 204, 218.
E. von Hartmann 41.
Cf. Part I, Section 3.21, First Interpretation (C).
Cf. Michelet (Preface, p. viii).
Cf. Haring’s (98f.) criticism of Liebmann.
Haring 139. One could object to Haring that it is incorrect to represent dialectical-logical movement, movement of pure thought, by figures of circles. The same objection could be raised against our presentation, against Hegel’s expression ‘circle’ which appeals to the imagination, against drawings in mathematics and against mathematical-logical symbols. This objection can partly be invalidated by the advice that our figures be correctly interpreted: the elements of the dialectical movement which are dissociated in the figures must not be taken as spatially and temporally separate.
Albrecht 15ff. — A severe criticism of Coreth’s interpretation is to be found in Kruithof 290f. — N. Hartmann attempts to interpret and criticize Hegel using a notion of dialectic which is altogether unrelated to metaphysics and idealism (cf. our Part III, Section 2.33); according to Albrecht (9), Hegel’s method is inseparably conjoined with idealism, must rely on it as an “essential presupposition”, and loses all meaning when severed from it. According to ou interpretation, Hegel’s method presupposes extreme realism (in the sense explained in Part I, Chapter 1), and has idealism (the theory according to which the absolute is formed by a process of universals, in which there is no room for spatial and temporal separation) for its goal.
Haring 138.
Phalén l70.
Kroner 312; Kruithof 37.
Kruithof 25: “Many bookson Hegel… in Belgian and Dutch libraries are not cut open.” 31 Mure II (Introd., p. viii).
Kruithof 296.
Cf. Part I, Section 3.21, First Interpretation (B), (c).
Cf. Kruithof 19ff., 43f.
Hyppolite (II 234ff.) and Garaudy (I 200ff.) criticize the dualist interpretation of A. Kojève. They themselves (Hyppolite I 386; Garaudy I 213), however, fall into dualism when they claim, like dialectical materialists (cf. note 14), that there is an opposition between method and system. 36 Cf. Epilogue, note 13.
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Sarlemijn, A. (1975). Introduction. In: Hegel’s Dialectic. Sovietica, vol 33. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1736-7_1
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