Abstract
In Chapter Two I argued that the arguments for radical meaning variance have failed. In the present Chapter I wish to argue that the radical meaning variance position in itself is unreasonable. That is, I wish to argue that it is unreasonable to maintain that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force a change in the meanings of the terms employed which is radical enough to preclude the possibility of comparisons of scientific theories from different traditions through appeal to, and on the basis of, some sort of shared meaning of the terms employed. The position has several methodologically unacceptable consequences which are not, as has been argued, avoidable. As an aid in noting some of these I feel that it would first be profitable to examine some examples which have been put forward to illustrate and suggest the position.
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Notes
As Kuhn notes: “[Brahe] himself had looked for parallax with his great new instruments. Since he found none, he felt forced to reject the earth’s motion” ([41], p. 201). Further, “Brahe’s skillful observations were even more important than his system in leading his contemporaries toward a new cosmology. They provided the essential basis for the work of Kepler, who converted Copernicus’ innovation into the first really adequate solution of the problem of the planets” ([41], p. 206). In spite of Kepler’s mysticism — which incidentally he argued for on metaphysical grounds, and not by a linguistic analysis of the meaning of ‘sun’ — he still sought confirmation for his helio-centrism through experiment. Thus, “without proper experiments, I conclude nothing” ([37], V, 224; cf. also I, 143). Interestingly enough, Hanson himself notes this: “They [Brahe and Kepler] met in Prague in 1600. Brahe was at this time working on his theory of the orbit of Mars, which Kepler found unsatisfactory, since Brahe’s miscalculations amounted sometimes to a 5° disagreement with observations (this was not excessive for the geocentric theories then prevalent). Kepler adopted the heliocentric view” ([27], p. 73, my italics). Cf. again Kepler: “… after I had by unceasing toil through a long period of time, using the observations of Brahe, discovered the true distances of the orbits, at last, at last, the true relation… overcame by storm the shadows of my mind, with such fullness of agreement between my seventeen years’ labor on the observations of Brahe and this present study of mine that I at first believed that I was dreaming…” (Harmony of the World, 1619).
A similar objection also has been raised by Achinstein ([1], p. 499), Shapere ([78], p. 57), and Fine ([20], pp. 231–232). Feyerabend recently [18] has accepted the force of this objection and attempts to circumvent it by providing a new sense for the predicate ‘incompatible’ as applied to different theories. We will examine his answer in the next section.
For some technical details cf. [26], pp. 1099–1103.
For some technical details cf. [36], pp. 271–273.
Three other replies, written earlier, to somewhat similar problems are to be found in [16], pp. 216–217. Each is admirably criticized by Shapere, [78], pp. 58–61.
For some technical details on the concept of an isomorphism which suggests these results, cf.: [38], pp. 221–230; [57], pp. 90–92.
I have recently discovered that Achinstein ([2] pp. 93–94) provides a surprisingly similar counterexample to Feyerabend’s proposal by using Keynesian theory and quantum theory. Our respective remarks concerning Feyerabend’s proposal, though independently arrived at, are quite similar and to the same point.
Shapere ([75], esp. p. 145) has suggested that this claim itself may not be intelligible.
This consequence of radical meaning variance has also been noted by Achinstein ([1], p. 499; [2], pp. 97–98) who presents an admirable discussion of the problem.
Most writers within the logical empiricist tradition (e.g. Carnap, [8], and Hempel, [31]) would not be open to this argument. They would maintain that a set of “reduction sentences” determines the meaning of a term “only partially” ([31], p. 28). Theoretical concepts would be permitted to enter new general principles and laws in order to preserve “openness of meaning” for the technical terms of science ([31], pp. 28–29). Yet, prior to their entering into the new generalizations and laws, the terms are held to already possess (in virtue of “‘operational’ criteria of application… expressible in terms of observables”) some determinate “operational meaning” which remains invariant ([31], p. 29).
Achinstein’s, otherwise excellent, discussion ([2], pp. 97–98) fails to recognize this point.
Just this, however, was not done when light bent when travelling near the sun.
Central to his view is that T’ is a more efficient alternative for purposes of testing T the more radically different in meaning T’ is from T (cf., e.g., [15], pp. 7–8).
Feyerabend has very recently come to recognize this consequence, cf. [19]. We will discuss his remarks on this point in Section VII.
Neither Kuhn nor Feyerabend has succeeded in providing any extra-theoretical or cross-theoretical basis or approach which is both consistent with their radical meaning variance position and which would also constitute a means by which incommensurable theories could be compared in an indirect way (cf. IIB, end of V). In this regard, however, we will also examine Toulmin’s attempts in VIC and VID.
For some good illustrations and further substantiation of this point cf.: Purtill, [62], pp. 55–56; Fine, [20], pp. 237–239; Shapere, [78], pp. 71–81; and Achinstein, [1], pp. 503–508.
The following discussion of Toulmin’s view is based on my article, [39].
The above points up some conceptual difficulties with Whorf’s hypothesis. There is, however, empirical evidence which also disconfirms his hypothesis, cf. M. Cole et al., [9].
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Kordig, C.R. (1971). The Methodological Undesirability of Adopting a Position of Radical Meaning Variance. In: The Justification of Scientific Change. Synthese Library, vol 36. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1734-3_3
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