Abstract
A fairly definite philosophy of science can be extracted from Quine’s Word and Object (henceforth referred to as WO). Earlier versions of his philosophy of science, for example in his From a Logical Point of View, contain phenomenalist and instrumentalist tendencies of thought, but in WO these have almost entirely disappeared in favour of an explicitly realistic philosophy of science. What, then, is Quine’s philosophy of science in WO?
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References
See Antony Flew, ‘Again the Paradigm’, in Mind, Matter and Method (ed. by P.K. Feyerabend and G. Maxwell ), Minneapolis 1966.
See P.K. Feyerabend, ‘Problems of Empiricism’, in Beyond the Edge of Certainty (ed. by R.G. Colodny), Pittsburgh 1965, especially pp. 181, 220, 225.
On this point see Marshall Spector, ‘Models and Theories’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (1965) 121–142.
A. Grünbaum, Philosophical Problems of Space and Time, New York 1963, Chapter 4.
See also W.V. Quine ‘Reply to Professor Marcus’, Synthese 13 (1961) 323–330, and discussion by Quine and others ibid. 14 (1962) 132–143. Quine’s paper and the discussion can also be found in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. I (ed. by M.W. Wartofsky), Dordrecht 1963.
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© 1969 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Smart, J.J.C. (1969). Quine’s Philosophy of Science. In: Davidson, D., Hintikka, J. (eds) Words and Objections. Synthese Library, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1709-1_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1709-1_2
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